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ixI GENERAL PRINCIPLESChapter 1. Introduction 3
1 Introduction
1.1 Purpose of text
The purpose of this book is to present a new governmental model
based on the interests of ordinary people in their individual, group
and collective capacities. While most governments rely on virtue in
civic life, my model only assumes that each individual acts in his
own rational self-interest. If he or she is virtuous, so much the
better. But the proposal doesn t rely on individual virtue to cause
good government.
Throughout the text I shall point out some shortcomings of current
constitutional arrangements and their adverse effects on the daily
lives of ordinary people. Also I shall attempt to highlight the dif-
ferences between present constitutions and my proposal. But the
format of this book does not allow it to be a comprehensive
comparative study, and it was never intended as such.
It is especially fitting to present these ideas now. Not only are
constitutional arrangements the subject of debate in large parts of the
world, but simultaneously socialism has crumbled as an economic
model. These events represent the triumph of the rational self-
interest model in economic thinking. They also represent a rare
opportunity for large-scale constitutional reform.
1.2 How the book is organized
Readers who wish to get a quick understanding of the proposed
governmental mechanisms should concentrate on tables, figures and
the immediately accompanying text. For a list of tables and figures
see page 170. Chapters 1 through 9 present the general principles of4 General Principles
the proposed governmental structure. Chapter 2 provides a summary
of the essential points. Supplemental material is set in small type.
Part Il SECTION BY SECTION COMMENTARY is a reference section
for those who want to study the constitutional proposal in detail. Part
III contains the actual text of the proposed constitution. Part IV
contains marginal notes, references to other literature and an index.
1.3 Summary
The purpose of this report is to present a new model for governmen-
tal structures based on the interests of the citizens in their individual,
group and collective capacities.Chapter 2. The structure of the proposed constitution 5
2 The structure of the proposed constitu-
tion
2.1 Three foundations
The proposed constitution has three fundamental ideas:
• Devolved popular sovereignty
• Inter- and intra-governmental competition
• Just processes for arriving at and enforcing decisions
The first foundation is compound. Devolved popular sovereignty
requires an analysis both of devolution, sovereignty and the term
"popular". The second foundation is at least partially dependent on
the first, as competition can take place only if there are multiple
independent decision makers, which is easiest made possible by
devolving some power away from the center. Thirdly decisions based
on devolved popular sovereignty and competitive procedures are also
just processes for arriving at decisions and they ensure that govern-
mental actions conform to the interests of ordinary people.
Of course, in the actual text of the proposed constitution several of
these fundamental ideas may influence the phrasing of any one par-
ticular section.
2.2Confederate structure
The Constitution is built on a confederate structure where state law
is superior law, and the individual states retain their sovereignty and
in
dependence, including the right to secede. (See below for defini-
tions of federations and confederations.)6 General Principles
This structure encourages competition between governmental units
and ensures that government continues to obey the wishes of the
citizens.
The central government s task is to take care of the common good
as defined by the citizens in their collective capacities, ease co-
operation, provide the states and the citizens with alternate solutions
to their concerns, and provide cohesion and guidance. But if the
people of a member state reject confederate legislative proposals, it
has no power to compel enforcement. Its coercive powers are limited
to only those powers needed to ensure that individuals in their
collective, group or individual capacities, have an opportunity to
choose.
Confederations
The traditional definition of a confederation is a body whose laws are binding only on
sovereigns. This means that confederate legislation has to be transformed into internal
legislation in each member state to be binding on that state s citizens and court system.
As Figure 1 shows, the paths of control in a confederation are top-down, but if a state
fails to carry out confederate instructions, the confederation may take action only
against state authorities. As happened during the Gulf war of 1991, it is common for
state authorities in these circumstances to protect themselves behind a wall of ordinary
people
  . This makes the people rather than the responsible state leader suffer the
consequences of illegitimate state action. As central decisions do not extend directly
to individuals, traditional confederations are inherently unstable. Either they fall apart,
with confederate instructions becoming no more than polite advice, or they evolve
into federations.
`The United Nations is in fact a confederation, and the Iraqi
authorities were probably legally bound to obey U.N. resolutions.
However, legal technicalitites turned out to be of minor importance as
the Iraqi leaders hid and continues to hide behind a shield of innocent





extend rights and obliga-
tions directly on in-
dividuals in each mem-
ber state. (See
Figure 2.) Obviously it
is much easier to coerce
individuals than it is to
coerce state authorities
that have the full powers
of the state at their dis-
posal for protection.
Thus the central powers
tend to be much more
important within a fede-
ration than within a con-
federation.
If state and federal laws
conflict, as they in-
variably do eventually, it
is the central body s
laws and legal system that prevails. Central law is superior law, and the paths of
control are top-down.
Since federal law prevails with respect to each individual, there is no need for the
central government to instruct state governments, and normally it doesn t have this
authority.
Contemporary federations and confederations
The traditional definition of a federation includes the United States of America,
Canada, Australia, Germany and Switzerland. Perhaps surprisingly, the European
Community ends up being a federation as well.
There are three forms of Community law: A) Regulations; which automatically
become law for everyone living in Community countries, B) Decisions; which
au
tomatically become law for particular bodies or persons, and C) Directives; which
order member states to make laws of their own to give effect to community policies
(Letwin, page 14). It follows that the European Community can only be classified as
Figure 1 Traditional confederation8 General Principles
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This book s definition of a confederation differs somewhat from the
traditional definition. A federation is a multi-governmental entity
where central law is superior law, while a confederation is a multi-
governmental entity where local law (state law) is superior law.
This new definition allows confederations to act directly on in-
dividual citizens, and thus provide the level of cohesion now offered
only by federations, and it gives the term confederation a more
meaningful content.
Important features of new confederate definition
The new definition preserves the fuzzy popular notion that confederations are "looser
"
structures than federations; more based on cooperation than coercion.
Figure 2 Traditional federationChapter 2. The structure of the proposed constitution 9
From the local-law-is-superior principle it follows that interaction within a con-
federation has to rely on voluntary cooperation between the member states, while a
federation ultimately relies on coercion.
As seen by individual citizens, the traditional and the new definition of a confederation
are related. If confederate law can act only on sovereigns and has to be transformed
into local law to act on individuals, - then from each citizen s point of view, state law
is superior law.
The proposed definition is also consistent with the prior classification of the United
States of America, Canada, Australia, Germany, Switzerland and the European
Community as federations.
It is the force to coerce and compel, rather than propose and persuade that distinguish-
es the new federations from the new confederations. A confederation relies on bottom-
up paths of control while a federation relies on top-down paths of control.10 General Principles
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State law is superior law
State borders are fixed or
determined by central
authority
State borders are deter-
mined by those directly
affected
Structure is based on
centralized command
politics
Structure is based on
voluntary cooperation and
popular sovereignty
Cohesion is provided by
central authority s power
to coerce and compel.
Cohesion is provided by
the central authority s
power to propose and
persuade.Chapter 2. The structure of the proposed constitution 11
2.3 Two parts
The Constitution itself is divided into two parts: Chapters 1 through
4 specify the powers of the three contracting parties; the states, the
citizens and the Confederation in relation to each other, and Chapters
5 through 10 specify how the confederate government is to be
organized, and put limitations on the powers of the different
institutions within the confederate government.
The purpose of this division is to allow the confederate government
to organize itself as it pleases and in a way that proves convenient,
but prevent these institutional changes within the central government
from encroaching on the sovereignty of the states. For similar
reasons there are no references in the first part to institutions in the
second part, neither are there references the other way, except that
certain actions by the confederate government naturally presuppose
a legal basis in Chapter 3.
Chapters 1 through 4 of the Constitution are also superior to
Chapters 5 through 10.
2.4 Summary
The proposed constitutional model is built on three fundamental
ideas:
• Devolved popular sovereignty
• Inter- and infra-governmental competition
• Just processes for arriving at and enforcing decisions
The new Confederation has extensive powers to persuade and
propose, but limited powers to coerce. Contrary to present federa-




The modern meaning of sovereignty was introduced by Jean Bodin in 1576. According
to the New Columbia Encyclopedia, sovereignty is the supreme authority in a political
community
" .
The origin of popular sovereignty, on the other hand, goes most directly back to what
is called the social contract school of the mid 1600s to the mid 1700s. Popular
sovereignty is the notion that no law or rule is legitimate unless it rests directly or
indirectly on the consent of the individuals concerned.
Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679), John Locke (1632-1704) and Jean-Jacques Rousseau
(1712-1778) were the most important members of the social contract school . They
all postulated that the nature of society, whatever its origins, was a contractual
arrangement between its members. The reason men entered society was to protect
themselves against the dangers of the "state of nature". But, their theories differed
markedly in other respects.
Hobbes claimed that the first and only task of political society was to name an
individual or a group of individuals as sovereign. This sovereign would then have
absolute power, and each citizen would owe him absolute obedience. Hobbes concept
meant that popular sovereignty only existed momentarily. In modern terms we might
say that it consisted of "one man, one vote, once".
Locke as well, claimed that the social contract was permanent and irrevocable, but the
legislative was only empowered to legislate for the public good. If this trust was
violated, the people retained the power to replace the legislative with a new legislative.
It is unclear whether Locke deposited sovereignty in the people or in the legislative.
Though he was less absolute than Hobbes, he clearly didn
 t intend popular intervention
to be commonplace. If anything, Locke
 s vision is probably closer to the British view
of Parliamentary sovereignty.
Rousseau claimed that laws enacted by the legislature could only address the common
good of the society
 s members and they could only extend the same rights or
obligations to all citizens. Rousseau, however, didn t elaborate on what would happenChapter 3. Popular sovereignty 13
if these conditions were violated, but he did propose mechanisms to find out what the
"general will" was and he did see the legislative powers as vested in the people itself.
Thus there was a development in political theory from the very limited role played by
the people in Hobbes  theories, to the more significant popular sovereignty of
Rousseau.
Rule by consent in other fields of thought
Ideas and thoughts legitimizing the rule of consent also may be found in many
religious tracts. The Bible sums it up quite nicely and again not coincidentally : "Love
your neighbor as yourself." (Mark 12, 31), and "And as you would like that men
would do to you, do exactly so to them." (Luke 6,31). In other words; since you like
to control your life, let others control theirs. The implied promise is that the individual
and society will be happy and prosperous to the extent that this advice is followed and
the people is given the maximum amount of individual and group liberty and
sovereignty.
Contemporary psychologists as well, in their search for the sources of happiness and
depression, have found the same result. Happiness, confidence and success are closely
related to a belief in one
 s ability to influence one s own fate. Depression and failure
are related to a feeling of inability to control one
 s own life; to a feeling of being
controlled.
To most people these truths seem so evident that they need not be argued. But in
practical politics there is an enormous resistance to giving ordinary people the final
say.
3.2 A contemporary definition of popular sovereignty
According to the New Columbia Encyclopedia, sovereignty is "the
supreme authority in a political community". The sovereign is that
individual or group that has absolute power to make law. The
absolute power to make law is also the power to make the rules by
which the other authorities operate. The chief characteristic of a
sovereign body is thus that it makes the decision making rules for
L L14 General Principles
government .
The termpopular sovereignty is supposed to mean that this ultimate
power belongs to the people, but what is the most common con-
temporary interpretation? Most Western democracies claim to base
their government on popular sovereignty, but in reality the people
have little ultimate authority short of revolution. Most decisions,
even fundamental decisions, are left to the legislatures. It is usually
the legislature that controls the constitution, the most basic instru-
ment of government, and the extent of popular authority is usually
at this body s discretion. Even where popular consent is required,
the legislature usually has the sole authority to propose amendments.
In reality this means that sovereignty is most commonly placed in the
legislature. It is this body, rather than the people, that has the
ultimate power to make law.
On the other hand, in order for a government to be truly popular it
would have to provide the people with at least as much authority as
any other body, and in addition a right to overrule that body. In
practical terms this means that an updated definition of popular
sovereignty has to rest on the people s ability to:
  Adopt its own basic law or constitution
  Propose and adopt amendments to the basic law or
constitution
If the people have these powers, they may institute any other
changes they desire. If they don t have these powers, however, it is
unclear how it can be legitimately said that the government rests on
the supreme authority of the people.
 This set of decision making rules, whether collected
in one or several documents, is that state s basic law or
constitution.Chapter 3. Popular sovereignty 15
3.3 Popular sovereignty and direct democracy
Direct democracy means that the people directly decide all issues,
instead of delegating decisions to representative bodies like national
legislatures; while popular sovereignty means that the ultimate
political authority is deposited in the people. It follows that popular
sovereignty and direct democracy are closely related, but they are
not exactly the same. Crudely simplified we may say that popular
sovereignty is political theory at a more basic level, while direct or
semi-direct democracy is its practical and pragmatic manifestation.
Much of the discussion in the following chapters will therefor focus
on (semi)direct democracy, its implementation and effects.
As an aside I might add that it is possible to have direct or semi-direct democracy
without popular sovereignty. Ordinary people may be allowed to make ordinary laws,
but barred from changing the constitution. Such a combination was proposed in the
United Kingdom around the turn of the century.
Similarly, it is possible to have popular sovereignty without direct democracy in its
purest form. This is the usual form of popular sovereignty; a combination of
representative bodies and ultimate popular authority. But it is not possible to envision
popular sovereignty without such a form of semi-direct democracy.
Semi-direct democracy is a combination of direct democracy and
representative (also called indirect) democracy. A semi-direct system
is characterized by the people having delegated legislative powers to
a parliament or other representative body, but having made this
delegation revocable and limited. Besides the legislature there must
also be a mechanism allowing for the people to express its will
directly.
For reasons of simplicity the rest of the book also employs the term
direct democracy to describe the direct parts of a semi-direct
governmental system.
The proposed governmental system is a semi-direct democracy.16 General Principles
History of direct democracy in Europe
The history of popular sovereignty and direct legislation goes back a long time. It can
be found in some greek city states of antiquity, and among the germanic tribes of
northern Europe. At the time of the Greeks and the Romans, the northern Europeans
lived in small groups in sparsely populated areas. In such societies, there are definite
limits to oppression. If people are dissatisfied, they simply gather in a little group to
move on to greener pastures elsewhere. This way of life naturally leads to an essential
equality in fundamental political decisions. After all, these groups or tribes can only
be kept together by voluntary compact. Thus the nature of frontier society gave every
young able-bodied individual a stake in fundamental decisions.
Later, voting with your feet largely ceased being an option as the more fertile parts
of Europe became more densely populated and land became scarce. The emergence
of agriculture as the dominant food source, reinforced the vulnerability of ordinary
people. In an open landscape, with a sedentary lifestyle it became harder to escape
tyrants and their professional fighting men. Over time this lack of effective
countermeasures led to the emergence and growth of feudal institutions.
In the less accessible parts of Scandinavia and Switzerland, however, repression was
more difficult to enforce, and the local landsgemeinde or things survived for a
considerable period. The original landsgemeinde were general assemblies of all adult
free-men that met once or twice a year to resolve important issues. In Norway during
the time of the vikings (around 1000 a.d . and even later) kings were still elected or
approved at the local direct assemblies, and usually there was more than one
contender. This multiplicity of choice acted as a brake on royal ambition. For a long
time there was no real central government, and even after its creation, the geographi-
cal conditions were such that only occasional supervision of local communities could
be accomplished. Even if you did have a fall-out with the monarch, you could usually
escape to other viking communities in Iceland, Normandy, Ireland, England, the
Orkneys or the Baltics with impunity.
The regional representative assemblies assumed many powers of the earlier Norwegian
direct assemblies beginning about 1000 a.d. However, these representative assemblies
had almost un-fettered legislative powers at least until 1152 when the first serious
attempts at national legal harmonization were made. The things or representative
assemblies did survive until 1662, but their powers steadily eroded with the increasing
influence of the church, the dwindling number and professionalization of members,
and the appointment by the king of an ever larger fraction of the total.
Even after the time of the Vikings, during the more powerful Danish-Norwegian
kings, central government enforcement was still difficult, and several tax collectors
failed to return to the capital. On the continent or in the flat eastern part of Norway,Chapter 3. Popular sovereignty 17
the king or the feudal lord could employ heavily armed professional soldiers on the
sedentary population. But heavy arms were of little help in Switzerland, Iceland or in
the Norwegian mountains with their ample opportunities for ambush and guerrilla war-
fare. Neither were there many fields to burn as the population to a large extent relied
on husbandry, fishing and hunting for subsistence.
Thus by the Middle Ages the democratic traditions of citizens  assemblies survived
only in Iceland, in parts of Norway, possibly in parts of Sweden, and in the original
Swiss cantons. Scandinavia eventually succumbed to absolutism, and direct democracy
survived only in Swiss towns and cantons.
In Switzerland, 1291 marked the establishment of a defensive league between the
original cantons of Uri, Schwyz and Unterwalden directed toward the feudal Hobs-
burgs. Swiss history as well is filled with much strife even after this time. But the
Swiss, contrary to the Scandinavians were never conquered and never ruled by
monarchs (excepting Napoleon).
It was the democratic traditions of Switzerland that later inspired Jean-Jacques
Rousseau. Rousseau s writings led to the adoption of the referendum in the French
Constitution of 1793, i.e. during the French Revolution. Though this Constitution
never came into operation, Napoleon used the referendum occasionally. It also led to
a revitalization in Switzerland itself.
In 1848, the new Swiss federal constitution gave the Swiss people the power to
demand the complete revision of the Constitution through the election of what was in
effect a constitutional convention. In 1874 the Swiss used this power to force the
adoption of the legislative referendum (the right to approve or reject ordinary federal
legislation). Later, the threat of another confrontation with the people led the
Parliament to propose and pass itself the constitutional initiative (approved 1891).
Direct democracy in the United States
The basis of the democratic traditions of the British colonies in North America is
similar to that in Europe. The North American colonies were far removed from the
hub of power. They were protected from royal interference by difficult communica-
tions and sheer physical distance. In this environment of free-men evolved the New
England town meeting.
The town meeting is an assembly of all adults (originally all male adults) called every
year to decide important local issues.
As in Switzerland several centuries earlier, the Americans resented central taxation
and interference with what they perceived to be internal American affairs. As in18 General Principles
Switzerland, geography hampered the military response of the central power, and
eventually secured the freedom of the American people and the preservation of its
democratic traditions. Thus as early as 1778, the Massachusetts constitution was
adopted by referendum. But this was hardly an expression of popular sovereignty as
I have defined it. Rather it was the people vesting its ultimate authority in a new
legislature according to the Lockean vision. This becomes quite clear in the American
Declaration of Independence of July 4, 1776:
...."whenever any form of government becomes destructive of these ends [life, liberty
etc.], it is the right of the people to alter or to abolish it, and to institute a new
government, ... "
Also, it should be noted that though the American Constitution starts off with
" We the
people of the United States
"..................etc. There is no way for the people to amend the
constitution. Popular sovereignty in its more radical form was introduced later. Today,
Delaware is the only state that does not require popular approval for constitutional
amendments, but the federal constitution has still not been updated.
The initiative, legislative referendums and other democratic reforms were also
postponed for another century. When these issues emerged or reemerged, it was
because of a maturing United States and a maturing political structure. The drive
westward was being completed and the opportunities for voting with your feet
internally in the United States were reduced. Simultaneously the political structures of
the older states were setting, while the ordinary man s entrepreneurial spirit especially
in the West, was still not completely subdued.
It is to this entrepreneurial spirit we probably have to attribute the reform movement
born in the American Midwest at the turn of the century. Many of these people had
moved thousands of miles to get to a place that offered individual opportunity and
individual choice. They didn t need or want a corrupt or party ruled legislature to tell
them what to do. In 1898 the reform movement managed to get the initiative adopted
in South Dakota as the first state.
Direct legislation in the United States is still largely a western phenomenon. Mostly
it has been introduced within a few decades of the state s erection, and before its
political structure has become too entrenched. Though several efforts have been made
at the federal level, the entrenched interests of pressure groups and party machines
have so far successfully repulsed every effort. The initiative also has been fiercely
resisted in most of the eastern states.
In Canada, direct legislation can be found in the province of Alberta and at the local
level.Chapter 3. Popular sovereignty 19
3.4Summary
This chapter defines popular sovereignty as the people s power to:
• Adopt its own basic law (constitution)
•
 
Propose and adopt amendments to the basic law (con-
stitution)
A basic law or constitution is a set of decision making rules fixing
the authority of each branch of government.
The practical manifestation of popular sovereignty is direct
democracy.
A semi-direct democracy employs both a representative legislature
and direct legislation. Throughout the rest of the text direct demo-
cracy will be employed to describe the direct components of a semi-
direct legislative system.20 General Principles
4 Direct democracy
4.1 Proposed constitution s use of direct democracy
The proposed constitution employs all the traditional instruments of
direct democracy; the referendum, the initiative and the recall. The
initiative and the referendum is employed to secure popular sove-
reignty and to foster competition between governmental units.
Equally important is a novel method for self-imposed taxation more
fully described in Chapter 8, page 53. The recall plays a more
subordinate role. For a description of the referendum, the initiative
and the recall see below.
Traditional instruments of direct democracy
Traditional direct legislation comes in three different varieties: the
initiative, the referendum and the recall. In modern times, the oldest
of these is the referendum, which often lead almost directly to the
later introduction of the initiative and the recall.
The referendum
The referendum is the peoples s power to approve or reject acts of
the legislature. It comes in several forms depending on the nature of
the legislation to which it applies etc..
The referendum may be characterized along the following four dimensions:
e Form of legislation:
A) constitutions or constitutional amendments, B) ordinary statutes,
and C) fiscal issues
• Initiator
A) the citizens, B) the legislature itself or parts of it, C) the
president or D) the states.
e Advisory or binding
  Voluntary or compulsory
This gives many possible combinations. However, some of these combinations areChapter 4. Direct democracy 21
more common and more important than Others.
The term referendum when employed alone, usually means a binding compulsory
referendum on ordinary statutes. In the United States or Switzerland this term is also
used in the more specific sense of a citizen initiated referendum. A citizen initiated
referendum is also called a petition referendum since it starts as a petition signed by
a group of citizens. However, as the number of signatures surpasses a certain
number, the petition ceases to be a petition in the ordinary sense and becomes instead
obligatory or compulsory on governmental authorities. If 50,000 Swiss voters petition
the government for a referendum on a federal statute, the government may not refuse
them. It is obligated by the Constitution to carry out the referendum.
Another common category in the United States and in the Swiss cantons, is the binding
compulsory fiscal referendum. In its typical form, the state (or canton) is obligated by
the state constitution to let the voters approve governmental debt increases.
Lastly, many countries require popular approval for constitutional amendments
(normally as a binding compulsory referendum).
The initiative
The initiative is the people s power to approve or reject legislation
initiated or proposed by someone other than the legislature.
The initiative may be characterized along the following dimensions:
• Form of legislation:
A) constitutions or constitutional amendments, B) ordinary statutes,
and C) fiscal issues
• Initiator
The citizens or the states.
• Advisory or binding
• Voluntary or compulsory
• Direct or indirect
The usual form of the initiative is as a citizens
  initiative or as a voters
  initiative.
(The two terms have the same meaning). This is legislation (whether ordinary statutes
or fiscal issues) proposed by a group of citizens through a petition. As with the
petition referendum, once the petition itself has gathered enough voter support in the
form of signatures, it becomes both compulsory and binding.
If the initiative is direct, it is placed on the ballot at the next election. If the initiative22 General Principles
is indirect, the legislature gets a chance to enact the proposal. Only if it fails in the
legislature is it placed on the ballot.
At the federal level in Switzerland can be found only the constitutional initiative.
Many American states on the other hand, allow both the constitutional and the
legislative initiative.
The recall
The recall is the people s power to force a public official out of
office. It can be found at the state (and local) level in the U.S. and
at the cantonal (and local) level in Switzerland.
As for the other instruments of direct democracy it comes in several forms:
• Application
A) all public officials whether elected or not, B) all public officials
except judges, C) all elected public officials including judges, and
D) all elected public officials except judges
• Direct or indirect
The term "direct recall petition
" means a petition that leads directly to a new election.
Indirect petitions only lead to a new election if they are successful, i.e., if the official
in question is actually recalled at the polls.
Besides these distinctions, there are many other variations. Sometimes, the recall may
only be employed once during an official s term, in other cases the official gains 6
months  or 1 year
 s immunity against new recall attempts, and sometimes the defeat
of the recall implies reelection for a new term.
4.2 Principal features of direct democracy
The principal features of direct democracy is its ability: A) to limit
the influence of pressure groups, B) to unbundle spending and legis-
lative decisions and C) to secure competition between governmental
units through proper arbitration.Chapter 4. Direct democracy 23
Limiting the influence of pressure groups
A principal feature of direct democracy is that it limits the influence
of numerically small but politically powerful pressure groups.
The direct vote of the citizens reduces the influence of special
interest groups by automatically weighing the interest of the smaller
group against that of the majority. In order for a proposal to gain a
majority in a referendum it has to offer advantages to a much larger
cross-section of the population than ordinary legislative decisions. In
all likelihood it has to be a positive sum proposal, while legislation
influenced by smaller pressure groups in all likelihood will be
negative sum proposals where the cost to the majority are larger than
the benefits accruing to the smaller pressure group due to costs as-
sociated with administrating and implementing the proposal itself.
Referendums and initiatives work by dramatically reducing the cost
(to the majority) of influencing government decisions. Political
influence in most representative systems comes through extensive
long-term lobbying. Such lobbying is expensive in terms of time and
effort, and it only pays to engage in it if the potential pay-off is
substantial. Usually it will not be rationally cost effective for
individuals to oppose actively governmental programs as the cost of
opposition (in terms of time and effort) exceeds the benefits of lower
taxation. Direct democracy reduces the cost of opposition to the time
and effort required to put a ballot in the ballot-box; an enormous
improvement over having to lobby legislators directly.
Direct democracy and direct decision making costs
One objection to widespread use of direct democracy concerns its alleged high direct
costs. According to Kendall and Louw (Kendall, 1989, page 135), the Swiss Federal
chancellery estimates the costs of a national initiative combined with a federal
counterproposal to about 1 Swiss franc per voter. Even when special ballots have to
be held to decide single issues, the costs are modest. In California such a special ballot
was held in 1973. It cost the state about USD 20 million, or about 80 cents (USD
0.80) per capita. (Walker, page 93).24 General Principles
Besides the direct costs incurred by government, comes the costs associated with
launching an initiative. In Switzerland this cost is estimated to at least one franc per
petition signature (Junker, page 122). In California initiative campaigns cost several
million dollars. In per capita terms however, these costs are still marginal, which is
why this method of making decisions is so effective. Even if we assume that the Swiss
spend a few million francs (everything included) on national issues every year, this has
to be compared with a Swiss federal budget of about 23 billion francs (1985) (Junker,
page 40).
The mismatch between the resources allocated by the government, and the input on
allocation allowed by each citizen may also be illustrated in another manner. While
one third to two thirds of the total resources of most developed countries are allocated
through the public sector, ordinary people are allowed decision making powers only
once or twice every four or five years. (I am here disregarding direct lobbying by
individual citizens as a practical alternative due to its high indirect costs.)
At the personal level, on the other hand, we are constantly incurring decision making
costs as we try to weigh the relative advantages of everything we buy from tooth paste
to motor vehicles and homes. Since the cost of each individual decision is much lower
in the private market sector, decision making costs including inconvenience and
allocated time is much higher for each dollar, franc or ecu each citizen spends as a
private individual than for dollars, francs or ecus spent via the public sector. Lower
private sector unit costs for decision making give many decisions and higher total
decision making costs. These higher total decision making costs are, however, more
than counterbalanced by the fact that funds are allocated according to each individual s
preferences. Thus there is ample room for governments to increase total direct
decision making costs, i.e. direct costs associated with ballots etc., and thus reduce
the unit cost of influencing individual governmental decision.
Anecdotal evidence; taxes
The most potent form of direct democracy, voters  initiatives, is today practiced
primarily in Switzerland and at the state level in the United States.
It is well known that Switzerland has one of the lowest tax rates in Europe. Among
the European members of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Develop-
ment (OECD), for instance, only Portugal and Turkey have lower total taxation as a
percentage of GNP. Other European OECD members at a comparable level of income
and development with Switzerland have much higher levels of taxation. In fact,
comparable in this respect is not so easy to define as the Swiss also have the highest
incomes. The Swiss position can pretty much be summed up by saying that the Swiss
enjoy the highest income and the lowest taxes of Europe.Chapter 4. Direct democracy 25
Table II Swiss and European taxes
Country Total tax receipts








OECD average 38.4 49.0
Source: OECD in Figures June/July 1991
In America, the most famous of all initiatives was Proposition 13 in California in
1978. In spite of opposition from both political parties and most public officials, the
voters decided to cut property taxes by 57%, from USD 12 billion to USD 5 billion
and restrict increases in the future. Similar proposals were later enacted in other
American states. (Kendall, Frances: Let the People Govern page 139)
The following table of state tax rates gives further evidence of the correlation between
democracy and taxes.26 General Principles
Table III Direct democracy and tax rates
Y = yes, state has provisions for legislative citizens  initiative


































Sources: tax rate information from Wilson, James Q., page
644
information about state initiatives from Butler,
David, pages 71-72Chapter 4. Direct democracy 27
Only one high tax state (Washington) has a provision for voters  initiative. Similarly,
six of seven states without an individual income tax are "initiative
" states, while only
one (Texas) is not. The results for states without sales tax (5) are indecisive; with 2
"initiative" states and 3 non-initiative states. (24 U.S. states or territories have
implemented the initiative.)
Though more comprehensive statistics are less clear-cut, the above evidence taken
with the history of the American tax revolt in the late 1970s and early 1980s and the
Swiss experience, substantiates that popular initiatives lead to lower relative taxes and
less governmental interference.
Unbundling spending and legislative coalitions
By its very nature direct democracy and especially the initiative,
tends to unbundle decisions since it enables individual citizens to
vote separately on each issue.
Representative political systems on the other hand tend to bundle
political decisions. As an individual you may approve a particular
candidate s views on taxes, but be opposed to the same candidate s
views on abortion. In a representative system you have to take the
whole bundle. As an individual voter you are not able to separate the
two issues.
Bundling reduces the general welfare. Any system that enables
unbundling is thus a superior system. Direct democracy allows
unbundling and is thus superior to a purely representative system.
Parliamentia and Democratia, an example
Let s suppose we have two identical states: Parliamentia and Democratia representing
respectively a parliamentary (representative) system and a semi-direct system. In both
countries a proposal to spend 100 million currency units (CU) on a national
tiddlywinks team (proposal A) and another proposal (proposal B) to spend 100 million
Semi-direct democracy: democracy encompassing both a rep-
resentative system (an elected legislature) and direct legislation by the
citizens. Semi-direct democracy can be found in Switzerland, both at
the federal and the local level, and in many American states.28 General Principles
currency units on bubble gum for school children is introduced.
Parliamentia
In Parliamentia the leader of the Leftright party (the sponsor of bill A) confers with
the leader of the Rightleft party (the sponsor of bill B). The Leftrights hold 25
parliamentary seats, while the Rightlefts hold 26 seats. Together they hold 51 of the
total 100 seats. They quickly agree on a quid pro quo, if the Leftrights vote in favor
of B, the Rightlefts in turn will vote in favor of A. This is done, and both measures
pass though each counted separately is opposed by about 3/4 of the MPs.
Peter Individual, a parliamentarian of the Rightleft party briefly considers voting
according to his convictions, but realizing the risk of being censored by or expelled
from the party (by that eliminating his chances of reelection to Parliament), he decides
to toe the party line.
Though the leader of the Leftrights could theoretically renege on his promises after
the approval of A, he doesn t do so as he realizes that he needs a similar gentlemen s
agreement with the Rightlefts for the approval of proposal F, to be decided in
Parliament the following week. (Here he is prepared to offer his support for G).
In other words as the order will be reversed the following week he has to keep to his
part of the current agreement. (Besides he is a man of honor, at least as far as his
fellow MPs are concerned.)
Democratia
In Democratia, on the other hand, the proposals are to be decided directly by the
people. The leaders of the Leftrights and the Rightlefts announce that they have made
a deal. They urge their supporters to back both measures. However, since voting is
secret, neither leader can identify party members or citizens that don t heed their
admonitions, and they certainly cannot expel anyone from the country. Thus the
citizens are free to vote according to their individual convictions. The citizens are also
a little bit piqued about the way the politicians have taken it upon themselves to tell
the people what to do. Thus both measures are heavily defeated.
The following year, however, the leaders of the Leftrights and the Rightlefts decide
to submit a single proposal (A B), incorporating both measures, to the public. By
simple calculation they figure such a joint proposal will be favored by 51% of the
voters.
Unfortunately, Truespeak, an independent citizens  action group sponsors a petition
drive for a proposal to withhold funds from the tiddlywinks team (A-negative).
Another group, Peoplepower, sponsors a drive to withhold funds from the bubble gumChapter 4. Direct democracy 29
project (B-negative).
At the polls, A B receives 51 % of the votes, A-negative receives 75%, while B-
negative receives 74% of the vote. Since conflicting measures are decided according
to the number of votes; the 100 million currency units support for the tiddlywinks
team (A) is neutralized by A -negative (51 % of the vote versus 75%), while the bubble
gum project is neutralized by B-negative (51% versus. 74%).
Conclusions
As the example shows, in representative assemblies, proposals may pass though they
do not represent majority opinions. This happens when the 25 representatives favoring
proposal A combine with the group of 26 representatives favoring proposal B to form
a majority of 51. This tendency is most obvious when it comes to appropriations, but
it also takes place when it comes to legislation. The net result is a steady increase in
the size of government despite the opposition of most voters and politicians.
Such alliances to push up spending or enact legislation are not possible however, when
decisions are returned to individual citizens. Since votes are secret, the leaders of
each faction have no means of enforcing agreements. There is no stick that prevents
individuals from voting according to their own convictions.
Popular votes as the arbiter between governmental units
As the proposed constitution creates a multi-governmental entity, it
has to provide a mechanism for resolving conflicts between subunits.
I am proposing that this power to arbitrate between governmental
units is devolved directly on the people. This method of ultimate
arbitration is the only one that ensures competition between govern-
mental units in fulfilling the needs of ordinary citizens.
4.3 Summary
There are 3 forms of direct legislation:30 General Principles
• The referendum,
often referred to as the people s veto power,
• The initiative,
which gives the people the power to propose and
enact legislation, and
• The recall,
which gives the people the right to call a new election
The referendum and the initiative limit the influence of pressure
groups by dramatically reducing the cost of opposing narrow
pressure groups. The referendum and initiative also improve the
allocation of resources by unbundling spending and legislative
decisions.
Popular votes also may be used as the ultimate arbiter in cases of
conflict between representative bodies or branches of government.
Evidence from both the United States and Switzerland suggests that
a greater say for the people may lead to lower taxes and a smaller
public sector.Chapter 5. The benefits of local control 31
5 The benefits of local control
5.1 Betterresults/Better resource utilization
Many of us intuitively feel that local control often produces better
results than central control. But, intuition is usually not considered
a valid argument in the political or scientific marketplace. In some
fields, studies support our intuition.
Education
In the United States, Americans have studied the effects of local
funding on graduation levels and SAT (Standard Aptitude Test)
scores. Test scores and graduation rates generally improve when
schools are locally funded instead of being funded by state or federal
authorities.
Many states with a greater local control also have more funding of
the school system. When people know where their taxes are going,
they may be willing to spend more. This could be part of the
explanation accounting for the difference in test scores and graduation
rates. On the other hand, the study also shows that more money
reaches the individual school in locally funded systems. Proportionally
less money is wasted in bureaucracy.32 General Principles
















• SAT (and ACT (Achievement Test)) score in %
of national average
(Source: Warren Brookes: Public Education   the Glo-
bal Failure of Socialism", IMPRIMIS, April 1990, Vol.
19, no. 4, pages 4 and 5.)
When comparing New Hampshire and Vermont for instance, we find
that teacher salaries and teacher-to-student ratios are virtually the
same in the two states. While Vermont spends 14% more per student
and 39% more per capita, New Hampshire students  performance on
standardized tests (SAT) are consistently better than their Vermont
counterparts. Thus Vermont spends more, with poorer results.
Funding in New Hampshire is over 90 % local, while spending in
Vermont is only 60 % local.Chapter 5. The benefits of local control 33
Number of public employees
The following table lists the average size (in population terms) of the
lowest governmental level, gemeinde in Switzerland and kommune
in Scandinavia, compared with the total number of public sector
employees as a percentage of total employment.
Table V Governmental devolution and effectiveness
Country Avg. population of
local authority
Public employees
as % of total
Sweden 28, 350 32.4
Denmark 18, 000 29.8
Norway 8, 900 23.7
Switzerland 2,100 11.2
Sources: Population figures: national statistics
Public employees: OECD in figures, 1990
This table shows that larger more centralized local authorities go with
many public employees, and that smaller less centralized societies also
have fewer governmental employees.
These numbers by themselves, don t say anything about cause and
effect. But if it is true that there are large untapped economies of
scale in government, how come the Swedish government needs almost
three times as many employees as the Swiss?
The opposite tenet seems much more likely. Though, from a1
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theoretical point of view, large scale economies of scale may seem
to exist, they are not realizable in the real world. In other words, the
diseconomies of organization quickly overcome the economies of scale
of service provision.
Size and economic growth
The two previous examples are from the realm of local government,
but the same tendencies appear at the national level. According to a
new study by University of Pennsylvania economist Robert Summer,
("Actually, small-fry nations can do just fine," International Business
Week, October 1, 1990, page 12) the average economic growth
among large nations is no higher than the average among small
nations. Countries with small areas and high population densities,
even grew a little bit faster than physically large countries. Incomes
in countries with either large populations or large areas tend to be
lower than per capita incomes in smaller countries.
Though small countries suffer disadvantages in market access and
access to raw materials, this is counterbalanced by the more important
conflicts between interest groups in the larger countries and the
resulting inefficiency of government.
5.2 Devolution and citizen satisfaction, an example
What is meant by more satisfaction? In this context it means that more
people (i.e., a higher fraction or the total) get what they want. Let
us suppose for instance, that we have two countries Centralia and
Devolutia with the same number of people. In both countries a
decision about whether to abolish blue laws (i.e. allow open grocery
stores on Sundays) are to be decided by popular vote (referendum).
In Centralia the 400 voters are divided into 4 polling districts, while
in Devolutia the 400 voters are divided into 4 districts that are also,
in this respect, self-governing states. The votes in each district are
as follows:Chapter 5. The benefits of local control 35














Total votes cast: 400
Votes in favour: 199
Votes against: 201




















No Sunday grocery stores
201 happy votersChapter 5. The benefits of local control 37
In Centralia 201 voters are happy as the blue laws are not abolished.
In Devolutia, however, 321 people got their way. In state 1 and 2,
blue laws were retained, while in state 3 and 4 they were not.
This simplistic example shows the fundamental power of devolution,
it makes more people happy by allowing greater diversity.
(Adapted from Kendall, Frances and Louw, Leon: Let the People
Govern, pages 148-150).
5.3 Summary
This chapter has given examples of the benefits of local control in
education and in local government. There are two principal benefits
associated with devolution and local control:
• Better resource utilization (operational efficiency)
•
 
Increased allocationalefficiency (better fit between people s
wants and what they get)38 General Principles
6 Devolved popular sovereignty
6.1 Introduction
The purpose of this chapter is to define devolved popular sovereignty
and show how devolved popular sovereignty can reconcile democracy
(majority rule) and individual liberty.
Historical background
Individual liberty and Hobbes s social contract
The ultimate basis for political power is often thought to have been a real or implied
social contract. This social contract is an agreement that every individual entered with
every other individual to protect himself against the dangers of the state of nature.
In Hobbes
 s version the first and only task of political society is to name the sovereign
(whether individual or group). The contract itself is permanent and irrevocable and
commits the individual to absolute obedience.
The main problem with this position is its lack of legitimacy with respect to the
descendants of the original contractors. Even if we assume that individuals can sign
away their liberty, is it legitimate to commit your descendants to slavery? Are we really
bound by our ancestors and have to accept meekly any government we happen to
inherit?
Most people would supply a resounding negative to the above question raised.
Individual liberty and Locke s limited legislative authority
The next stage in political theory is characterized by Lockean ideas. Locke maintained
that the legislative was limited to acts for the public good.
If the legislative exceeded these limits, the people were authorized to resist and if
necessary, overthrow the government and institute a new legislative. In a sense this
view solved the problem of self-inflicted slavery. The social contract was still thought
to be permanent and irrevocable, but the powers of government were limited, and
slavery certainly wouldn t qualify as an act for the public good.
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•
 
Although the contract is limited, is it acceptable and legitimate for one
generation to act for its descendants?
•
 
By whom or how is it to be determined whether the limited social contract
has been breached?
Individual liberty and Rousseauean majority rule
Rousseau tried to get around the problems of the Lockean contract in several ways:
•
 
He postulated that individual members of society were formally to consent
to the existing institutions upon coming of age.
•
 
He required the inclusion of all citizens in the deliberations and votes that
led to expressions of the general will (i.e. enactment of new laws).
Thus Rousseau answered the second question above by instituting majority rule.
Rousseau
 s contract is neither permanent nor irrevocable: The general will may only
enact laws that are addressed to the common good of the society
 s members, and that
extends the same rights or obligations to all citizens. If a law does not fulfill these
conditions, the social contract is violated and its obligation lapses.
However, Rousseau does not specify the practical consequences of a lapse of the social
contract, and the interpretation of what forms acceptable law is effectively left to the
majority. As there is no limitation on this majority rule, except those limitations that
the majority may elect to impose on itself and the vague guidelines mentioned above,
it is not hard to see how this system of government can lead to oppression of minorities
and individuals and suppression of individual liberty.
6.2 Devolved popular sovereignty and individual liberty
While traditional popular sovereignty gives the popular majority
ultimate power, traditional individual liberty claims inalienable rights.
By definition; rights cannot be inalienable if they are at the mercy
of some ultimate power, and no power can be ultimate if it has to
respect inalienable rights. These principles can only be reconciled if
there is unanimity, - or if the decision can be made to apply only to
a unanimous group.
Any decision can be made to apply to a unanimous group if the40 General Principles
minority is allowed to withdraw or exempt itself from the decision.
This power to exempt oneself from decisions in effect makes the
minority s power more ultimate than the ultimate sovereign power
of the people (group) as a whole.
I have used the term devolved popular sovereignty to describe such
a system where popular sovereignty is ordered according to group
size, and where the smaller group s sovereign power is superior to
that of the larger group of which it is part.
Sovereignty and statehood
In its practical implementation, the concept of individual or group
sovereignty at the state level does not apply to each individual
decision. It works at the level of adherence to a particular set of
decision making rules, a particular state or a particular set of
governmental institutions. (These terms are synonomous.)
As long as a an individual is a citizen of a particular state, he is
bound to follow the laws of that state as determined by the majority
of its citizens or its legitimate government. However, at any time a
group of any size may declare itself a new state. Since the group itself
is a subset of the total, its sovereignty is superior to that of the state.
As the group declares itself a new state, each group member ceases
to be a citizen of his or her former state, and the relations between
the group and their former state or states take on the character of
relations between states. Within this framework, a state can be defined
as any entity, whether consisting of a group or an individual, that
interacts with its neighbors or its surroundings through a state of
nature.
Statehood and territory
Strictly speaking, it may be sufficient to define a state as any entity
that interacts with its neighbor through a state of nature. After all,
this definition is closely related to the ancient definition of a nationChapter 6. Devolved popular sovereignty 41
as a group of people rather than as a territory. From a practical point
of view however, it is convenient that a state has a territory. The fact
is, today no state is recognized without territory. Territory and
statehood go together. This insistence on a one to one relationship
between territory and statehood is the major factor slowing or
preventing the erection of new states since the whole surface of the
Earth is claimed by one state or another.
This problem is resolved by allowing not only the withdrawal of
minds and bodies from individual states but also any property
belonging to those citizens wanting to erect a new state. As real
property cannot be physically moved, withdrawal of real property has
to take place through a reclassification process. If a group of people
want to erect a new state, any real property owned by group members
is reclassified as the new state s territory.
This view also corrects the present anomaly where real property is different from other
property in that it somehow "belongs to" a particular state. Real property like any other
property, belongs to individuals, and if they decide to relocate themselves to another
state, they may take with them their real property just like other property.
It follows that most new states are likely to be very small states at
the outset. However, the important issue isn t whether the territory
is large or small, but whether the new state possesses an initial
territory at all. Many smaller states, including such diverse countries
as Iceland, Luxembourg, Singapore and Monaco, seem to be thriving.
Such small states are obviously quite dependent on their neighbors,
but there seems to be no practical limit or cut-off point in terms of
state size, population or territory, as long as they are able to interact
peacefully with other states.
If the new state is successful in providing the freedoms, liberties and
services that people seek, its territory is likely to expand rapidly as
more people in its immediate geographical vicinity switch allegiance.
■42 General Principles
Devolved popular sovereignty at the confederate level
At the confederate level devolved popular sovereignty means that
ultimate power, the power to propose and adopt constitutional
amendments, rests with the states, and that each state has the right
to secede.
As a matter of practicality I have also made state law superior to
confederate law. This broadens the scope of devolved powers to also
apply to "ordinary" decisions.
Conclusions
In contrast with Rousseau and the other social contract theorists, the
proposed model makes democracy (and majority rule) immediately
compatible with individual liberty. The protection of individual liberty
becomes an integral part of the model itself, rather than something
that has to be added at the end. Devolved popular sovereignty
transforms minority and individual rights (individual liberty) from a
static set of criteria into a dynamic process for making decisions.
In addition, the consistency of the principle from the large units of
nations to the level of the individual makes application relatively easy:
Each individual comes to life unbound by the previous promises of
his ancestors, and with all liberties still intact. As soon as his
individual or group sovereignty is exercised, it overrules that of state
government. Until such time, it lies dormant and he has to obey the
laws of the state of which we are part.
Within each state, the general will is determined by majority rule
based on popular sovereignty,Chapter 6. Devolved popular sovereignty 43
6.3 Practical issues related to the application ofdevolved popular sovereignty
Free speech, an example of application
What is said about protecting individual liberty and minorities, however made up,
applies to human rights in general. For instance, if an individual is denied the right
of free speech within a particular state, he may declare himself a new state and speak
freely as much as he wants. He has just exercised his superior sovereignty. From a
practical point of view it is not very likely that a single individual will erect a new state.
The overhead simply becomes too great as his entire interaction with the outside world
has to take place across state borders. If free speech or any other right is infringed in
any serious way it is far more likely that a large group or even a major part of the
country secedes. On the other hand, the certainty that this is a legitimate alternative
may restrain the majority sufficiently in its exercise of power to make secession un-
necessary.
The individual as a state
It may seem ridiculous to allow a single individual the right to erect his own state. It
is very unlikely that such an action will take place, but as a matter of principle it is
important that it might take place. A comparison with free speech as practiced in the
Western World may be helpful. In most Western countries any individual may start
his own newspaper. The power of this principle is not related to the fact that most
newspapers are launched by individuals or that each individual is likely to launch his
own paper. Most papers these days are launched by major corporations, and there are
thousands of people to every paper. But the fact that free speech is individualistic
prevents the government from artificially restricting entry into that market. This in turn,
makes the market behave, almost, as if every individual was already part of it.
Individuals refrain from starting papers because their points of view are already
represented by one paper or another. The market is (almost) as diverse as it would have
been if every individual published his own paper.
Let s employ the viability argument on newspapers and see what happens. Let
 s assume
that free speech is not a right that pertains to the individual. Governments may plausibly
argue that newspapers started by individual citizens are not viable and should not be
allowed. Any particular individual citizen s point of view, it might be argued, is not
important as only organizations representing larger groups of people make a difference
anyhow. To make sure that these larger groups of people are legitimate, there probably
should be some kind of licensing system. - Md by the way, since everybody, or at
least those that represent important organizations and institutions, have access to all
papers, there is really
"no need for
" more than one or two papers in every major city.




The system 1 have just outlined is a system and line of reasoning employed by the44 General Principles
former regimes in Eastern Europe, most authoritarian regimes and by most Western
governments with respect to the newer media of radio and television. It is a paradox
that the Eastern European regimes that disallowed newsmedia started by individual
citizens probably spawned more small newspapers, as underground carbon copied
newsletters, than any Western country where the news business is unrestricted.
Individual free speech is not important because every individual will take advantage
of it, but because, if it is recognized, it transforms society in such a way as to make
individual use less urgent.
In today s world many groups try to build their own states or separate from empires
or federations. What can possibly happen if we let them build their own states? What
if we allowed every individual the right to build his own state? Would we get very
many new states? At the beginning some, later, - a few. The act of allowing peaceful
state erection by indidivudals would transform politics and society so that it would no
longer be necessary for most minority groups to build a state of their own.
War and forcible annexation
As long as the principle of devolved sovereignty applies, human rights and individual
liberties are protected. However, with all the wars going on around the world, what
would prevent an existing state from simply annexing its newly erected neighbor by
force? There is no easy answer to this question. We can note as a matter of fact that
few if any democratic states forcibly annex their neighbors. There are at least 3 reasons
why force should not be used: A) The attacking state always runs the risk that the
attacked state will defend itself by armed resistance, B) Condemnation may damage
or strain the attacker s relations with other states hurt its own people both in the short
term and in the long term, and C) The
"policeman" whether in the form of the United
States, the United Nations or the proposed Confederation may arrive to sort things out.
The power of political theories lies in their general acceptance and legitimacy. In my
case they provide the necessary rules for determining when the confederate government
should intervene, and what the goal of intervention should be. No contemporary
organization have such clearly defined and in my view, honest and legitimate goals.
This lack of intellectual coherence shows up in indecisiveness and timidity, with large-
scale human suffering as a result; just ask the kurds and the peoples of the former
Yugoslav and Soviet republics. A government that does not follow the proposed norms
also will be illegitimate and therefore more susceptible to overthrow. If it is a member
of a European Confederation it will be forced to comply, at gunpoint if necessary. If
adopted, the proposed system would also provide a guiding rod for UN intervention.Chapter 6. Devolved popular sovereignty 45
6.4 Summary
This chapter defines devolved popular sovereignty as the principle by
which group sovereignty, as far as the group is concerned, overrules
the sovereignty of the collective whole.
At the most basic level, devolved popular sovereignty allows each
individual to erect his own state. In order to make a state viable, it
has to have its own territory. Since all land on Earth is already
claimed, it is no use saying that people may withdraw from society
by going somewhere else.
This withdrawal from any particular state is made possible by
recognizing that property belongs to individuals and not states. The




In relation to government, each citizen may be viewed both as a
shareholder and as a customer. As shareholders we elect a Board of
Directors (Representatives) to run the enterprise on our behalf, while
reserving important decisions for a direct vote by the citizens.
As the previous chapters have examined our role as governmental
shareholders, the purpose of this chapter is to examine constitutional
mechanisms in view of our role as governmental customers. We shall
be looking at constitutional mechanisms for introducing and
preserving competition between governmental units and governmental
decision making models. Competition is not a goal in itself.
Competitive markets optimize the use of resources so as to make
everybody better off.
Vertical and horizontal competition, definitions
The proposed constitutional model supports two kinds of inter-
governmental markets: a vertical competitive market between
governmental units at different levels, and a horizontal market
between units at the same level. Individual states would all be at the
same level, while the Confederation would be at a higher level. While
federal constitutions like the Treaty of Rome or the U.S. Constitution
inadvertently provide some competitive horizontal mechanisms, no
current constitution provides for vertical competition.
The importance of vertical competition
There are two fundamental reasons for emphasizing vertical
competition:Chapter 7. Inter-governmental competition 47
•
 
Since central government by definition is unique, the only
means of subjecting it to competition is by subjecting
it to vertical competition.
•
 
Unlike horizontal competition, vertical competition provides
freedom of choice without forcing the citizens to move
physically, and it provides competition between
existingorganizations within a given geographical area.
Vertical competition is a powerful complement to horizontal
competition. It is not a subsitute.
7.2 Vertical competition and independent action
Independence of action and state powers
Independence of action, or lack therof, is the greatest obstacle to
vertical competition.
There are two traditional ways of defining state powers; either by
enumerating the powers of the states, and leaving the residual to the
federal government, or by enumerating the powers of the federal
government and leaving the residual to the states. Usually each level,
either the state level or the federal level, is left with a monopoly
regarding each subject matter. The degree of centralization is then
determined by how extensive the monopoly powers of the central
government are compared with the monopoly powers of each state
government.
In order to create competitive pressures, however, authorities have
to overlap. Instead of fixing tasks at a certain level (statism), the
proposed constitution creates a dynamic equilibrium where the
efficacy and prowess of each governmental unit decides the extent of
its activities. It is the citizens at the lower governmental level that
eventually decides whether any particular task should be carried out
either at the confederate level, the regional level or at the state level.48 General Principles
Each state may take over any confederate task, but the confederate
government has the option of appealing the decision directly to the
state citizens. The Confederation also may ask the citizens for
permission to assume responsibility for any task neglected by the
states. This process ensures the principle of subsidiarity, i.e. the
carrying out of tasks out at the lowest possible level. The easier it
is to move tasks between levels, the more competitive the market.
(For the particular mechanisms for moving tasks between levels see section 1.4, page
127 and section 3.2, page 132 and the corresponding commentaries pages 69 and 83.
The payment mechanisms for tasks requiring financial outlays is described in section
1.5, page 127 and commentaries page 70).
The proposed system also allows governmental units at the same level to act indepen-
dently of each other. One state may decide to take over a particular confederate task
within its jurisdiction, while other states continues to rely on confederate services.
Independent institutions
Since state law is superior to confederate law, what prevents the states from nullifying
confederate powers altogether? The independence of action of the Confederation and
each state is insured by sections 1.1 and 3.1. respectively and by the other sections of
the Constitution granting each of them certain prerogatives. These prerogatives
supersede ordinary laws.
The Constitution grants the Confederation co-sovereignty with the states. This means
that state authorities are not allowed to interfere with confederate decision making or
with the carrying out of legitimate confederate tasks. Neither may the states direct or
influence the actions of individuals when they are carrying out legitimate confederate
business.
Recursion and intermediate layers of government
To lower barriers of entry, section 1.7 (Regional bodies) provides for
the erection of intermediate bodies between the state layer and the
confederate layer. The powers to erect regional bodies are themselves
recursive, so that each intermediate layer may be empowered to build
new intermediate layers etc.. (Provided each intermediate layer s
constitution is modeled on the proposed confederate constitution.)
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constitution contains a similar recursive mechanism.
Empowering regional bodies
As part of the same section 1.7 the relationship between the
Confederation and a regional body may be governed by the same rules
as that between the Confederation and the states. The Region may be
empowered to take over confederate tasks on the same terms as the
states. On the other hand, the Confederation will have the same power
of making proposals in regional matters as in state matters. Since
states control their own constitutions (section 2.2) and treaties are
limited to a fixed period or terminable upon notice, the states will
always retain their status as the ultimate sovereigns.
If the proposed Constitution is used as a model for setting up a
regional body, the states will also retain the right to assume a task
either directly from the Confederation or from the Region. (The
Confederation retains the right of making proposals all the way down
to the states.)
Closing the size gap
Easing the erection of intermediate governmental layers also enhances
competition by closing the size gap between the confederate and state
layers.
As anyone appreciates, private individuals will have a hard time
competing with General Motors in the making of cars. Auto
manufacturing have real economies of scale and effective competition
can only be provided by giant companies like Ford, Toyota and
Daimler Benz. At the same time it is quite clear that you can be a lot
smaller than GM and still be competitive. Thus it is not size alone
that counts.
Similarly it is important to keep the difference in relative size between
go
vernmental units in different competing layers within a certain
range to make the whole structure competitive. But regional bodies50 General Principles
like GM  s smaller competitors, can still provide competitive services
even if they are much smaller than the Confederation.
7.3 Horizontal competition
Horizontal competition rests on many of the same assumptions as
vertical competition.
Independence of action
Independence of action is secured for each state by that state s
sovereignty, independence and freedoms. Within its own borders, and
broadly speaking, as long as it doesn t interfere with the proper
interests of other states or their citizens, each state is free to take any
action it pleases. Independence from above is again secured by state
sovereignty and by state law being superior law.
"Left" and "right" mechanisms
Horizontal competition is increased by allowing the free movement
of people, goods and real estate. "Movement" of real estate is
accomplished by reclassification (movement of borders) or by the
erection of new states. In most cases it is probably easier to move
borders than real physical resources. It is thus likely that horizontal
competition will increase significantly. State governments that are
unable to compete will see their citizens disappear as their borders
close in on them. Ultimately the state itself will be wiped off the map
and pave the way for new states that are more responsive to the needs
of the citizens. This is not a new process, but until now the erection
of new states or the movement of borders have had terrible costs in
blood and human suffering.Chapter 7. Inter-governmental competition 51
Barriers of entry
If there is a mechanism for wiping out entities that don t perform,
(and such a mechanism is necessary in competitive markets), there
has to be a corresponding mechanism for the creation of new entities
(states). Without such a mechanism, competition would gradually
decrease as the number of states dwindled.
The barriers of entry should be as low as possible to ensure as much
diversity and competition among the states as possible. The lower the
barriers of entry, the more likely that government will respond to the
needs and wants of the people.
The proposed constitution  s section 2.5 on self-determination provides
for the peaceful erection of a new state. Ease of erection is ensured
by: A) The decision is left to the population within the proposed new
state boundaries. and B) There is no limitation on the size either in
terms of population or in terms of area of the new state.
These rights are enforceable by confederate authorities.
Removal of artificial restraints
It is also important that competition between states is not reduced
through artificial restraints. Section 2.3 ensures the mobility of
people, with their goods and capital. Section 2.4 prevents the
discrimination of out-of-state citizens.
7.4 Summary
Vertical competition
The main element of the proposed system of vertical competition is
to create two or more parallel governmental layers (the Confederation,
the regional bodies and the states). Each layer acts independently, its
authorities overlap those of the other layers and the decision about
which tasks each layer is to perform is left to the people as consumers52 General Principles
of governmental services. A payment mechanism is introduced to
encourage competitive behavior.
Vertical competition is complementary to horizontal competition. It
is not a substitute.
Resource mobility into and out of the central government sector is
covered in a separate chapter on confederate taxation.
Horizontal competition
Horizontal competition is increased by allowing for the movement of
lines on pieces of paper (borders) rather than physical resources
(people, buildings, machinery etc.), and by the ease of erection of
new states.
As for most federal constitutions, regulations easing the physical
mobility of resources (people, goods etc.) are retained.Chapter 8. Confederate taxation 53
8 Confederate taxation
8.1 Proposed solution; Competitive and restraining components
Due to the unitary (monopolistic) nature of central government,
special care has to be taken in constructing a confederate fiscal
system. While the states will be restrained from excessive taxation
by inter-state competition, the unitary nature of the Confederation
prevents this mechanism at the central level. Accordingly, the
proposed solution has a competitive component and a restraining
component and the issue of the level of taxation is separated from the
mode of taxation. The competitive component applies only to what
is taxed and how it is taxed, given a particular level of taxation. The
restraining component only deals with the level of taxation,
irrespective of collection.
To achieve competitive behavior in collection, funds are requisitioned
from each state. This leaves each state free to decide what is to be
taxed, and how to tax it with the minimum economic dislocation. (In
case of non-compliance/non-cooperation by state authorities, the
Confederation is empowered to make up the shortfall by direct taxes
on the citizens.)
The level of taxation on the other hand, is decided directly by all
confederate citizens by Dutch auction. By reducing the level of
taxation to one figure and separating the level of taxation from
collection, the level of taxation can be determined directly by the
ultimate payees, i.e., ordinary people. This method together with
measures designed to balance the budget, is intended to force the
politicians to live within their budgetary means. The proposed method
is able to raise any amount of money for the confederate budget,
provided the charge is approved by the people. Unlike present
procedures related to taxation, it is unable to raise funds contrary to54 General Principles
the wishes of the population.
8.2 Disadvantages of traditional measures for raising public revenue
There are four possible alternative methods of Confederate fundraising:
• Specific revenue sources




Specific revenue sources has 3 distinct disabling features: A) It doesn
 t provide for
the raising of enough money in times of extraordinary requirements; B) It doesn
 t
provide a mechanism for the deflation of the confederate budget after the formerly
limited powers have been breached; and; C) It provides no incentive for collecting taxes
with the least amount of distortion to the economy.
The first two objections really go together. Since the only way the central government
can garner more funds is by expanding its taxing authority, there will be continuing
pressures to breach the revenue straitjacket. Over long periods there will always be
occasions where this makes sense from a short term point of view; typically during a
war or other crisis when central government needs funds to arm. Once the barrier is
breached, central government grows until the new revenue sources are exhausted, and
at the next moment of crisis, it is the same story all over. The author does not know
of a single instance where revenue sources once ceded to central government have been
returned to local authorities.
The third objection is a little bit different. Since specific revenue sources leave the
central government without any choice as to what to tax, by definition it cannot design
its taxes to minimize economic dislocation.
The mildest consequences of specific revenue taxation probably will be encountered
with import duties or tariffs. This source is also the most common. Import duties or
tariffs will essentially act as protective tariffs, but this is less important if domestic
competition is sufficiently fierce. If the Confederation is very large with varied living
standards, ample domestic supplies of raw materials and a diversified industrial
structure, the negative consequences will be limited. Imports will be substituted by
domestically manufactured goods at a moderate cost differential. On the other hand,
this also puts a limit on how much revenue can be collected by the Confederation, andChapter 8. Confederate taxation 55
whets the appetite for other more substantial revenue sources.
Concurrent revenue sources
Concurrent powers of taxation exist when the central government and the states may
lay and collect taxes independently of each other. Concurrent taxation is often combined
with specific revenue sources so that some taxes are concurrent and some specific to
the central body. The typical mix, is a combination of central import duties combined
with concurrent vat or sales tax(es) or income tax(es). Indirect taxes, like value added
taxes are simply added up. If the central government lays a tax of 5% and the state
lays a tax of 10%, the total tax is 15%.
Concurrence has the great advantage that it avoids unnecessary conflict. The issue of
taxation becomes one of convenience. How can revenue be gathered with the least effort
by the government and inciting the least opposition from taxpayers? There is little or
no haggling between governments to get access to the most attractive sources of
revenue. If there is a need at a particular level, it can be fulfilled as the citizens and
the government at that level sees fit. Contrary to specific revenue sources, concurrent
powers are flexible. They can fitincreasing central needs in times of crisis (war), and
increasing local needs in times of peace. Thus at least from a revenue point of view,
governmental tasks may be carried out at the most effective level. Indeed, flexibility
and independence when it comes to revenue may often be seen as a prerequisite for
independence of action.
Concurrence is however, inconsistent with inter-governmental competition, as it will
be impossible to escape monopolized central taxation.
The major problem with concurrent taxation is how to restrain the confederate
government. Since the money doesn
 t come out of their pockets, the states will have
little incentive for acting as catalysts in restraining the confederate government. The
state government
 s interests may in fact be the exact opposite. Due to competitive
pressures there will be definite limits to how much each state can raise its own taxes,
but if it can persuade the central government, with its monopoly powers, to raise
enough money and then transfer money back to the state, this "problem
" will not arise.
In effect the federal or central government is coopted into an arrangement whose sole
purpose is to defeat the interests of ordinary people. Concurrent taxation is a recipe
for disaster in the field of fiscal restraint.
State appropriations
State appropriations has the advantage that it restrains the centralizing powers of the
Confederation. It has the disadvantage that by itself it doesn
 t insure the Confederation
sufficient funds to carry out its tasks.56 General Principles
If voluntary contributions are to work, there has to be a fixed method of finding each
state s share, and there has to be a mechanism for compelling payment. In effect, this
would be a requisitioning system where the charge was determined not by the institu-
tions of the Confederation, but by the states collectively.
Such a system has the disadvantage of being susceptible to state collusion. See also
decoupling and unbundling page 57.
Traditional requisitioning
In a system of traditional requisitioning the Confederation chooses an amount that is
payable by each state. This alternative has the advantage of being clearer, shorter and
simpler to express than the concurrent taxation alternative. It also makes the flow of
funds more visible, by that making it easier for the people to decide whether the flow
of funds into confederate coffers corresponds to their wishes. And it does provide the
states with an incentive to monitor confederate spending and present alternatives.
But since it allows the traditional bundling of spending decisions, and the traditional
coupling of revenue and spending measures, it is likely to lead to tradtional runaway
governmental budgets. Its most immediate disadvantage is risk of non-compliance by
individual states and instability due to the low legitimacy of central institutions.
Decisions taken directly by the people are likely to have a much greater authority than
requisitions enacted by a central legislature.
See also decoupling and unbundling page 57.
8.3 Additional comments on fiscal restraint
The proposed mechanisms for confederate spending and taxation has
3 important characteristics: A) taxation is decided freely and directly
by the citizens through Dutch auction, B) taxation is decoupled from
spending decisions, and C) spending decisions are unbundled. These
3 elements act together to restrain the confederate share of the total
economy, and they tend to produce spending decisions beneficial to
the general welfare of the inhabitants.
The chief advantage of a Dutch auction system is that it allows
citizens to decide the level of taxation without artificial restraints. A
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making a prior judgement as to what to put on the ballot; a process
that is also likely to be confrontational. Dutch auction decisions on
the other hand, are non-confrontational and non-prejudicial.
The proposed system also ensures that each vote is equally important.
Decoupling and unbundling
Decoupling and unbundling is essentially the same mechanism applied
to two different decision. With unbundling, two or more spending or
legislative decisions are separated. Decoupling separates taxation
decisions from individual spending decisions. With the proposed
system it is not possible for instance, to link several spending
decisions to create a majority for higher taxation. Each proposal to
spend more money has to pass two hurdles. First, funds must be
available (as confederate requisitioning), secondly given availability,
each project will be ranked according to its support in the entire
population. Thus even if a particular group, e.g. farmers, vote in
favour of higher taxes, they cannot be assured that the increased funds
will be spent according to their particular preferences, e.g. farm
subsidies. As each spending project is unbundled, it must meet with
the approval of at least 51% of the voters, but since it also competes
with other projects for a fixed sum of money, the actual required
approval rating may be considerably higher. This assures us that
central government projects increase the general welfare instead of
narrow pressure group welfare. Since pressure groups cannot be
assured of a payoff (e.g. higher farm subsidies), it also puts a damper
on their support for higher taxes.
Prerequisites for both decoupling and unbundling are: A) secret
balloting making it impossible to enforce agreements that seek to
exploit the minority, and B) many participants to make it difficult
to form coalitions and even more difficult to enforce them.58 General Principles
8.4 Summary
There are two sets of difficulties in designing a system to raise
confederate revenues: A) The system has to be compatible with inter-
governmental competition, and B) the system has to reflect the
people s opinions about the wanted level of taxation at any point in
time.
The two traditional central revenue measures in a federal system:
specific revenue sources and concurrent taxation are neither
compatible with intergovernmental competition nor do they ensure
a level of taxation consistent with the wishes of the people.
The proposed solution ensures inter-governmental competition by
separating the issue of how much tax from the issue of how to collect
the tax. Collection is left to the states according to their own
preferences. Tax level responsiveness is ensured by giving the people
the right to decide the appropriate level of taxation by Dutch auction.
All procedures are eased by standardizing confederate taxation
decisions to per capita figures.Chapter 9. Confederate institutions 59
9 Confederate institutions
9.1 Introduction
The Constitution is built on a standard presidential system with a
bicameral legislature (a House of Representatives and a Senate) and
a supreme court. The President, however, has more extensive veto
powers than usual. The blending of the executive and legislative
functions caused by extensive veto powers is justified by the
President often being more representative of the will of the people
as a whole than the legislature, viz Table IX (see next page).60 General Principles







Congress, 2/3 majority 33 1/3
Congress, 5/6 majority 41 2/3
President, veto 50
The People, direct legislation 50
The People, amendment to part
two of the Constitution
55
The People, amendment to part
one of the Constitution
60
The table is based on the following assumptions: Representatives, Senators and the
President is assumed to be elected by majority voting. The composition in the two
houses of Congress is assumed to be similar, so that a measure which passes in the
House also passes in the Senate. (In effect, Congress, for reasons of simplicity is
assumed to act like a unicameral legislature.) The percentages apply to participating
electors, i.e. excluding abstentions.
The calculation is as follows: A congressional majority is assumed to require the
assent of 50 % of the legislators (+ 1 representative and +1 senator). The election
of this half of the legislature is assumed to require the assent of 50 % of the electors
in their respective districts (+ 1 elector for each district). The minimum % popular
support behind each majority decision then equals one half of one half, which is one
quarter, or 25 %.Chapter 9. Confederate institutions 61
The table also shows the range of legislative mechanisms employed
by the proposed Constitution. A nearly continuous range of different
mechanisms lessens the opportunities for legislative arbitrage
(attempts to put legislative decisions into different categories in order
to justify usurped powers, e.g. making a constitutional decision
appear as a legislative decision).
The higher percentages required for constitutional amendments are
justified by the desire to distinguish between rules for decision-
making and particular applications of those rules, i.e. ordinary
legislative decisions. Rules for decision making are collected in the
Constitution, while particular legislation is decided by ordinary non-
constitutional statutes.
The confederate institutions together hold the sovereign powers of
the Confederation as defined in Chapter 3, but they do not hold any
more powers than that chapter gives them. Textual and logical
separation improves clarity and allows for easier, clearer and better
defined clauses and future amendments.
With the proposed system it would, for instance, be possible to
introduce a parliamentary system by making changes to part two of
the Constitution, but without changing the powers of the Confedera-
tion as defined in part one. This is not a recommended change.
The advantages of a presidential system are twofold: A) Governmen-
tal powers pose less of a threat to individual liberty when they are
divided between several independent branches, and B) the President
may act as a proxy for the whole people in the legislative process.
9.2 Bill of Rights and General provisions of
part two
The Bill of Rights, chapter 9, contains a bill of rights modeled on
the U.S. constitution. The rights have been modernized due to social62 General Principles
and technological changes. The section on Freedom of speech, for
instance, has been amended to take into account broadcasting and
cable networks. Likewise the section on privacy has been expanded
to expressly include wiretapping (interception of communications).
The Bill of Rights is binding on all confederate institutions, including
the courts. The provisions are likewise binding on state institutions
and courts, unless of course, a particular state enacts specific
legislation to the contrary. The principle of devolved sovereignty
allows confederate rights to be more extensive and confederate
authorities to be more restrained than state authorities. This result is
precisely what we want: We do not, for instance, want a European
Confederation to adopt an official religion. On the other hand, if the
British want to preserve the Queen s title as "Defender of the Faith"
there is no reason why they should not be allowed to do so.
If a state wants to modify the rights provided by chapter 9 according
to local circumstances, it is free to do so, but since conflicts with
out-of-state citizens are handled by the confederate system, it is not
able to enforce such modfications on anyone but its own citizens.
The last chapter of the proposed Constitution, Chapter 10. General
provisions of part two, may be subdivided into 2 parts: A) sections
defining procedures for the operations of confederate institutions,
e.g., the requirement that at least one day every year shall be
designated confederate election day, and B) temporary clauses
relating to the saving of existing legislation. These latter sections
may be adopted according to the circumstances.
9.3 Summary
The confederate institutions consist of a presidential system with a
standard bicameral legislature. The President has been given
extensive powers in order to counteract the legislature s naturalChapter 9. Confederate institutions 63
inclination to overspend and overlegislate. Separation of powers have
been enhanced compared with other constitutions.
The limited coercive powers of the Confederation means that it will
have to rely on a more aggressive style in promoting its policies in
competition with those of the states. The executive and legislative
branches have been significantly streamlined in order to support a
more active style of government.
The Constitution contains an enhanced and modernized Bill of Rights
modeled on that of the American Constitution. The Bill of Rights is
binding on confederate institutions, and will extend to the individual
states, unless superseded by state legislation. The introduction of the
Bill of Rights in part two of the Constitution, allows it to contain
provisions that would be inappropriate or unnecessary at the state
level.II SECTION BY SECTION
COMMENTARYChapter 1. State powers 67
1 State Powers
1.1 Sovereignty
Section 1.1, page 127 serves two purposes: A) It confirms the
independence and sovereignty of each state, and B) it limits the
powers of the Confederation to those expressly delegated. Section
1.1 is best understood together with the rest of chapter 1, which
expands on particular aspects of each state s sovereignty and the
preservation of that sovereignty.
The preservation of state powers must also be seen in the context of
the Constitution s general design as a voluntary compact between the
states.
The U.S. Constitution and most other federal constitutions lack a
similar guarantee of state rights. According to the Preamble of the
U.S. Constitution the powers vested in the federal institutions are
granted by the people in their collective capacity. In practice this
leaves the State authorities of the U.S.A. in a precarious and
subservient position in relation to the federal government.
Other federal constitutions are no better than the American Constitu-
tion in this respect.
The Tenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution leaves the implied powers of the
federal institutions intact (Smith, E.C ., page 19) and does not appreciably change the
situation.
Section 1.1, page 127 follows closely the U.S. Articles of Confederation Art. II, and
is equivalent to the Swiss Constitution s Article 3.68 Section by Section Commentary
1.2 Defense
Section 1.2, page 127 serves two purposes: A) It reaffirms each
state s sovereignty by expressly allowing for state defense and state
defense forces; and B) it disallows the use of force in inter-state
conflicts. (Actually it disallows the forced entry of one state s armed
forces into another state.)
The second subsection of 1.2 legitimizes peace-keeping operations
by the Confederation through the Confederation s right to defend and
enforce the Constitution (Section 3.5).
The emphasis of section 1.2 is strictly on defense. No state may
engage in aggressive extra-territorial behavior without the consent of
the Confederation (see subsection 3.5.2).
Section 1.2 corresponds to the U.S. Constitution s I.10.3 and the Second Amendment.
But it gives each state much wider powers than the Swiss or U.S. Constitutions since
it doesn t contain the same constraints as those articles. Article I, Section 10.3 of the
U.S. Constitution for instance, obligates the states to seek permission from the
Congress (i.e. federal authorities) to keep troops or ships of war, cfr. the Second
Amendment (
"the right to bear arms").
1.3 Secession
Section 1.3 confirms the independence and sovereignty of each
individual state by expressly granting each state the right to secede
from the Confederation. The right to secede also emphasizes the
fundamental nature of the Constitution as a voluntary compact
between states. No government is legitimate unless it rests on the
consent of those governed. If the citizens of any one state wants to
secede, the confederate government is no longer legitimate with
respect to that state, and it should resign its authority. In order for
a state to secede it has to submit the question of secession directly
to the citizens for decision.Chapter 1. State powers 69
Section 1.3 has no equivalent in the U.S., where the states are not
allowed to secede (viz the American Civil War, 1861-64).
1.4 Superior law
Section 1.4 defines the proposed governmental organization as a
confederation. In a confederation state law is superior law, while in
a federation central government law is superior law. 
By making state law superior, the states are given the means by
which they can defend their independence and sovereignty from
confederate encroachment.
This section also provides the "down" mechanism necessary for
vertical competition (competition between governmental entities at
different levels). (See section 3.2 for the corresponding "up"
mechanism.)
Both the Treaty of Rome and the Swiss and U.S. Constitutions
define federal law as superior law.
1.5 State assumption of a confederate service
Section 1.5 serves the twin purposes of: A) Expressly granting each
state the right to take over a confederate task or service within its
own jurisdiction; and B) Granting the state a financial compensation
corresponding to the savings incurred by the Confederation. The
financial compensation is essential in preserving real state autonomy
and real choice. Without such a clause, state citizens would be
 According to the definitions employed in this
document.70 Section by Section Commentary
obliged to pay for the same service twice; both through state taxation
and confederate requisition.
Each state may also discontinue confederate services on similar
terms.
Section 1.5 applies to all welfare legislation and transfer payments
of any kind. But this power does not extend to those essential con-
federate judicial or other powers expressly granted in the Constitu-
tion itself (see chapter 3). The Confederation obviously has the right
to provide the chapter 3 services independent of whether a state
wants to assume them. Any disagreement concerning the extent of
confederate privileges, would have to be referred to the people (state
citizens) or , ultimately, to the Constitutional Tribunal for decision.
Section 1.5 provides the down mechanism for vertical inter-govern-
mental competition. Through the financial compensation mechanism
it provides state authorities with the necessary financial incentives
needed to foster competition and innovation. With the exception of
tasks expressly delegated to confederate authorities, the people
decide whether any given task should be performed by confederate
or state authorities ,cfr. section 3.2.
This section has no equivalent in other federal or confederate
constitutions.
1.6 Treaty powers
This section serves the purpose of expressly preserving each state s
right to make treaties. It is necessary to preserve this right to prevent
the Confederation from achieving by treaty what cannot be achieved
by statute. Term limits on treaties prevent one generation of voters
from binding its posterity, cfr. also Section 10.4 Sunset clause.Chapter 1. State powers 71
Section 1.6 allows two or more states to solve internal problems
without involving the Confederation. Similarly, states may make
treaties for solving local issues involving foreign neighbors. It
ensures the ability to solve problems at the lowest possible level
(subsidiarity).
Issues of legitimate confederate concern are covered by the limita-
tions on secrecy and the constitution s sections 1.2 (deals with
internal conflict), 1.4 (treaties are subject to the constitution), 3.5.2
(limitations on movements of military forces) and 3.5.1 (the
Confederation s right to enforce and defend the constitution and the
states).
This section has no direct equivalent in other federal constitutions.
The U.S. Constitution (Subsection I.10.1) expressly forbids the states
to enter any treaties, while the Swiss constitution (Art. 7, 9 and 10)
grants the cantons limited treaty powers. The Treaty of Rome grants
the European Community exclusive treaty powers with respect to
matters of trade and many other important economic issues.
1.7 Regional bodies
The purpose of section 1.7 is to enable the erection of regional
bodies. This section enhances vertical competition by providing the
people intermediate layers of government and with additional
suppliers of governmental services. It also closes the size gap
between a large confederation and smaller individual states and
ensures a gradual increase in the territorial reach of governmental
units.
Section 1.7 enhances the treaty powers of the states by obligating the
Confederation to recognize the existence of regional bodies es-
tablished by treaty, and by giving the states the option of conferring
some of their confederate privileges on regional bodies. Two orli
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more states may for instance, agree to cooperate on the assumption
of a confederate service and delegate to a regional body the privilege
of receiving financial compensation from the Confederation. Small
states may also elect to have their populations counted together to
ensure representation or a better representation in the confederate
congress.
Section 1.7 has no equivalence in other constitutions.
1.8 The constitutional tribunal
The twin purposes of section 1.8 are: A) To establish a Constitution-
al Tribunal for resolution of constitutional conflicts between state
authorities and confederate authorities; and B) To ensure that the
Constitutional tribunal stays independent of the Confederation.
This section has no direct equivalent in other federal constitutions.
Traditionally, federal supreme courts have themselves been part of
the federal government and thus biased in favor of the federal
government. The history of the United States provides a typical
example of how selective interpretation of the constitution has
gradually, but steadily, eroded state rights. By interpreting federal
rights widely, and state rights narrowly, the federal Supreme Court
reduces the states to de facto sub-units of the federal government.
Similar tendencies are showing up in the judicial branches of other
federations including that of the European Community.
The proposal attempts to alleviate these problems through several
mechanisms:
A) The Confederation has been given no power to influence
the selection of judges. (Usually it is the states that have no
influence or very little influence in the selection of judges.)Chapter 1. State powers 73
B) No proceedings are to take place in the capital, nor is the
tribunal allowed to maintain any offices there. This is to
prevent the justices from identifying with confederate
institutions; and
C) The justices are called into service only at random and
hopefully, infrequent intervals. Their primary function and
interest will be in their respective state supreme courts.
Section 1.8 contains additional regulations regarding dismissals and
pay intended to safeguard the independence of the judges.
1.9 Amendments to part one the corn sact
The purpose of section 1.9 is: A) To safeguard state sovereignty by
granting the states exclusive rights to propose amendments to Part
One of the Constitution, B) To safeguard the rights of state citizens
by requiring their consent and C) To safeguard the rights of
individual states by requiring each state s consent to bind that state.
(Cfr. also section 8.6, the proposed Constitution s second amend-
ment clause).
Changes affecting each state s sovereignty are adopted by a 60%
double majority, but they are binding on each state only to the extent
approved by that state.
Changes concerning the inner workings of confederate institutions
(see sections 8.6 and 8.7), on the other hand, are binding if
approved by a double majority of 55%.
Section 1.9 has no direct equivalent in other confederate or federate constitutions.
Most constitutions do not distinguish between constitutional amendments that merely
reorganize central institutions and amendments that transfer power from one level of
g
o
vernment to another. Many constitutions leave both decisions in the hands the
central legislature. Very few of them bother to seek popular approval.74 Section by Section Commentary
The U.S. Constitution in reality leaves the initiative with the federal Congress.
The Treaty of Rome does leave the initiative with the states, and it does require
unanimity. But European citizens have no direct say.
Sections 8.6 and 8.7 correspond closely to Art. 121 of the Swiss Constitution, which
however, only requires a simple double majority (50%).
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2 Rights of the state citizens
2.1 Citizenship
Section 2.1 grants state citizens confederate citizenship.
This section is the equivalent of the Swiss constitution s Art. 43, first subsection.
The U.S. fourteenth amendment grants state citizenship to U.S. citizens, but strictly
speaking, not vice versa. In the U.S. naturalization is also strictly federal (1.8.4),
while in Switzerland it is partially federal and partially cantonal (Art. 44).
With the adoption of the Maastricht agreement similar Europe-wide rules will apply
to the European Community.
2.2Democratic government
The purpose of this section is to ensure that state government rest on
the consent of those governed.
This section is the equivalent of the Swiss  Art. 6, which also
guarantees that cantonal constitutions are adopted by the people, and
may be amended by the people.
The Treaty of Rome does not ensure popular sovereignty in member
countries, and most member countries leave ultimate power in their
legislatures.
The U.S. Constitution guarantees only republican, as opposed to
monarchical, state governments. Republican in this context, also
means representative as opposed to direct democracy:
"....in a democracy, the people meet and exercise the
government in person: in a republic, they assemble`ii
li
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and administer it by their representatives and agents."
James Madison, (The Federalist Papers, "Representative Republics
and Direct Democracies" page 150)
2.3 Freedom of movement
This section protects the free exit of citizens and property of any
kind from any state and thus also from the Confederation as a whole.
It protects both peaceful trade and the rights of minorities by allaying
fears of confiscation of property upon emigration or other obstacles
to emigration.
It does not restrain the individual state s powers to tax or disallow
imports on the grounds of health, safety or any other consideration.
Unlike the U.S. interstate commerce clause (1.8.3) or the European Community
treaties, it protects the interests of the citizens both in their individual capacity, as
when they want to emigrate, and in their group capacity, as when a state wants to
keep higher health and safety standards than the usual norm. (My proposal gives
individual states the right to restrain imports.)
Issues of safety and inconvenience related to transit will primarily be determined by
confederate authorities in their capacity as impartial umpires.
Subsection 2.3.3 provides a procedure that allows individuals the
right to take with them real estate.
The proposed mechanism allows peaceful resolution of minor border
adjustments and enhances competition among the states. If a state
consistently fails to give its citizens what they want, it will start
losing population and territory along the perimeter as people decide
to become part of neighboring states. Competition will be most
intense where language and cultural barriers are few, i.e. where
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2.4 Privileges and immunities,
This section expands the previous section by prohibiting the
discrimination against citizens from other states within the Confede-
ration. The first subsection is equal to the U.S. subsection IV.2.1.
If one state has more lenient immigration policies than other states,
the rights of naturalized citizens to settle in all parts of the Con-
federation may be restricted.
2.5 Self-determination
This section gives the people itself the right to decide which state
they want to be part of, or whether they want to erect a new state.
It serves the dual purpose of protecting minorities by enabling them
to erect their own states, and enhances competition among state
governments by allowing for the peaceful establishment of new
competitors (lowering barriers of entry).
A delimitation initiative has three important characteristics:
•
 
Border adjustments are initiated and decided by the
people
• Voting region is defined by the delimitation initiative
• Voting is supervised and enforced by the Confederation
Each of these characteristics is the opposite of current international
practice. In current federations border adjustments are usually either
initiated and decided by the central legislature or the borders are
fixed. The only means of input the local population may have, is
through the process of revolution. Secondly, the voting region, if
there is a vote, is normally defined by existing borders or by the
central authority. Thirdly, even if the local minority s position is
known, there is often a lack of an enforcing mechanism. The failures78 Section by Section Commentary
of present mechanisms are especially obvious in the present conflicts
in Yugoslavia and the former Soviet Union.
The proposed model rests on the principle of devolved popular
sovereignty. The local population, rather than a central authority, has
the right to initiate the erection of a new state. No authority, whether
state or confederate legally may prevent a vote from taking place.
The Confederation even has an express duty to make sure that the
Constitutional right to self-determination is upheld. The voting
region is also defined by the initiative itself. This prevents gerry-
mandering (manipulation of borders) to achieve a specific result.
Also since the initiative is self-defining it is likely to result in
borders that coincide with the geographical distribution of minorities
or ethnic groups.
The proposed model ensures that all borders and governments have
genuine popular mandates.
Establishing new borders
Subsection 2.5.2 specifies that the borders of the proposed new state are to be set
directly by the initiative itself. This provides a limited self-adjusting mechanism. If the
sponsors are too ambitious and include a very large area and significant minority
populations, they will not be able to get enough votes to have the new state
established. On the other hand if the territory of the proposed new state is too small,
significant populations that want to be part of the new state may not be included.
Subsection 2.5.7 complements the previous subsection by providing a mechanism for
more accurate delineation. Citizens/Owners that have been included in the new state
against their will, may retain their previcus affiliations. Those citizens that have not
been incorporated into the new state, but would like to become part of the new state
may employ 2.3.3 to reclassify themselves.
Subsection 2.5.7 also prevents the use of state erection as a mechanism for confiscat-
ing property. Lacking the individual right to retain previous citizen and territorial
affiliations, any two neighbors could team up to erect a new state that included a third
neighbor, and then upon erection, confiscate his property and divide the loot between
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Figure 3 Delimitation initiatives
In the special case of residential property where the residents are not owners, the
constitution would allow the expropriation of property by the new state. However,
here the owner s compensation would be determined by a confederate court, as the
owner would be an out of state citizen.
The clause on self-determination and the freedom of movement clause, does, however,
allow for the erection of enclaves and non-contiguous states. This inconvenience is a
price one has to pay for a just mechanism.
However, the problems with cost shouldn
 t be exaggerated. It falls primarily on the
beneficiaries, and it is a consequence of their own free choice. If a proposal for
erecting a new state contains a non-contiguous arrangement, the voters may take these
possible added costs and inconveniences into account in their decision. Similarly, the
clause on " freedom of movement
" gives the "receiving
" state the right to refuse a
particular territory.
Self-determination and expropriation
Clearly sometimes, self-determination, may also be seen as a means of avoiding
ex
propriation. Again there is a dynamic equilibrium at work. The property owner80 Section by Section Commentary
must weigh the relative merits of each state
 s compensation laws, the risk of having
his property expropriated and the inconveniences and costs related to living in an
enclave or having his property become part of a neighboring state. When the state has
already decided to expropriate, it is too late. The real estate owner must accept
whatever the (state) law gives him, unless he is an out of state citizen, and the
compensation is determined by confederate law or by state treaty. (See also
Confederate powers, the right to enforce and defend the constitution)
Secession and representative bodies
Even democracies treat secession with suspicion and hostility. When the borough of
Staten Island, by an 82% vote of its citizens, wanted to secede from New York City,
the Mayor s first comment is that he "firmly opposes the secession and doesn t intend
to sit by and watch the process passively." (Source:
"New York
 s Staten Island Studies
Seceding From City", Wall Street Journal (Europe), November 9. 1990)
The Mayor s reactions are precisely the same as, and in principle equally foreign to
the well-being of the people as those encountered by the Turkish and Russian speaking
minorities in Moldova, by the Moldovans themselves with respect to the prior central
government in Moscow, by the peoples of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, by the
people of Slovenia, Croatia, and the Kosovo region of Serbia etc.
The primary reason for "the establishment s" opposition to self-determination is
presumably that it threatens the very basis of that established authority
  s raison d etre
and power. Even in a representative democracy like New York City, secession
undermines the powers of the Mayor
 s office and of the city legislature. The right to
secede involves a very significant transfer of authority from the establishment back to
ordinary people. It reduces local authorities to competitive units instead of local
monopolies. This is also why secession should never be a decision of a representative
body. It should be decided directly by the people that want to secede.
2.6 General comments on the constitution s chapter 2
All the rights of the citizens as enumerated in chapter 2 are proce-
dural rights. Procedural rights are rights that say something about by
whom or how an issue is to be decided. Ideally they don t say
anything about the decisions themselves.
The reasons for concentrating on these rights are twofold. On the
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also limit the opportunities for the Confederation to muscle into state
affairs by using these rights as a pretext. Secondly, even if there is
a general agreement on many human rights, particular interpretations
may differ, and this may cause instead of reduce conflicts between
states.
The U.S. Constitution, for instance, has a clause prohibiting cruel
and unusual punishment. But what is the definition of cruel and
unusual punishment? Does it or doesn t it include capital punish-
ment? This is a typical issue where cultural factors can make it hard
for even sensible people to agree. The citizens of some countries
may believe that capital punishment should be completely abolished,
while others may feel there is a place for capital punishment when
the country is at war, or as a punishment for particularly hideous
crimes.
The issue of abortion may be another typical example of a legal field
where centralized decisions may cause rather than alleviate conflicts.
In Roe V. Wade (Smith, E.C., page 141) the United States Supreme
Court voided state laws that made abortions criminal offenses. The
interpretation rested on the "due process clause" of the American
Constitution (14th Amendment) which is assumed to protect the right
to privacy which again is assumed to include the right to abortion.
There is still considerable disagreement whether the protection of
privacy and the fourteenth amendment which dates from 1866
properly has anything to do with permitting abortion. These
arguments carry even more weight in the context of the specific
requirements that the Court has laid down for abortion legislation.
These issues are important also in a European context, - surely,
abortion views differ greatly between let s say secular Sweden and
catholic Poland. If the European family is to expand to include
islamic Turkey or islamic parts of the former Soviet Union, further
potential for conflict exists. Within such an expanded Europe,
fundamental islamic or other national or religious groups cannot be82 Section by Section Commentary
ruled out. A sensible model has to rule them in and find a method
of accommodation. The lesson to be learned is that extending the
scope of the exclusive central judicial powers increases the number
and severity of conflicts and encourages creative judicial interpreta-
tion at the center. Perhaps the U.S. Supreme Court would have done
the country a service by leaving these issues to the political aut-
horities of the individual states, so that they could have been
resolved according to local preferences.
By delegating these decisions to the individual states, conflicts may
not disappear, but at least they will be relieved by differing inter-
pretations related to local norms.Chapter 3. Confederate powers 83
3 Confederate powers
3.1 Sovereignty
The Confederation is co-sovereign with the several states. This
means that within the limits of the Constitution it can act indepen-
dently of the states. It can appoint its own officers, pass its own
legislation and so forth. As long as the Confederation keeps its
activities within the limits of the Constitution, the states have no
right to interfere.
3.2 The right of making proposals
Section 3.2 grants the Confederation the right of proposing changes
in each state s internal legislation to that state s legislature or directly
to its citizens. This section has two purposes: A) It enables the
Confederation to force a decision in the state legislatures, thereby
strengthening the powers of reform and protecting minority rights.
B) It provides the up mechanism for vertical competition. The legis-
lature of each state has the power to pull down any confederate task,
confer section 1.5. This section provides the countering up mec-
hanism.
By giving the people the power of arbitrating between the central
government and the state government, the Constitution ensures that
these two governmental layers have the best interests of the people
in mind when competing for power with each other.il
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3.3 Judicial powers
This section serves the dual purpose of: A) Putting the Confederation
in the traditional role of arbiter in inter-state conflicts; and B) Giving
the Confederation primary responsibility for preserving the proce-
dural rights of state citizens.
The arbitration of inter-state conflicts would extend to such issues as
for instance cross-border pollution. Groups of citizens being polluted
on by out-of-state parties could seek damages in confederate courts.
Confederate authorities would also be able to impose fees on
polluters to compensate those being polluted on. (But the Confedera-
tion would not be able to impose fees as part of confederate revenue
raising.)
If the states are able to agree on other arbitration methods, they are
free to do so by treaty. This puts a competitive element into the legal
system. If confederate courts are efficient and impartial, they will
get most of the business, if not, they ll soon find the states opting
for alternatives.
To prevent the Confederation from using the judicial powers to
encroach on state sovereignty, each state has the right to appeal
decisions to the constitutional tribunal.
This section is the equivalent of the U.S. subsection 111.2.1.
3.4 Legislative powers
Section 3.4 grants the Confederation general legislative and treaty
powers and authority to requisition funds from the states. Requisi-
tions must be apportioned according to population.
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treaties, the lack of limitations in confederate legislative subject
matter does not endanger the sovereignty of the states. On the
contrary, the concurrence of confederate and state legislative powers
ensures competitive pressures.
The Confederation s power to tax is limited to requisition funds from
each state apportioned according to population, with the added
proviso that it may enforce any requisition through the imposition of
direct taxes on citizens of non-complying states.
This approach maintains horizontal competition in taxation, and
makes confederate taxation impregnable to manipulation.
Direct popular determination of the level of confederate taxation
through a combined requisition/Dutch auction system (see section 8.1
fulfills the three requirements of a system of taxation:
•
 








Compatibility with competition between governmental
units
Several possible apportion methods exist. Apportionment according to population has
the following advantages:
A) Does not discriminate against successful states, i.e. in this context, states
with policies successful in enhancing economic growth.
B) Does not vary the tax burden depending on cultural factors, e.g. whether
both parents work for monetary wages or whether one of them stays at home
to look after the children.
C) Does not discriminate against states with efficient bureaus of statistics and
a small informal sector. Neither does it create the need for an elaborate86 Section by Section Commentary
confederate bureaucracy to estimate macro-economic variables for the various
states.
D) Is not open manipulation. Countries have been known for instance, to
change the definition of price indices by law to "achieve" objectives like low
inflation. Any method of apportionment other than a simple head-count is
open to the same kind of manipulation.
E) Makes it easier for the people to monitor and adjust the level of
confederate taxation. The per capita charge plays the same role in deciding
confederate taxation as standard weights and measures play in commercial
transactions. Standards ease information gathering and understanding.
The taxing power is not limited in monetary terms, but it is limited in form. The total
requisition may be any amount what-so-ever, but as long as the individual states pay
up, the Confederation may not impose its own direct or indirect taxes on the citizens.
3.5 The right of enforcing and defending the constitution
Section 3.5 gives the Confederation the authority to use any means
necessary and proper to enforce and defend the constitution and the
several states (See also U.S. I.8.18 for comparison). The Con-
federation is thus given the power of defending the constitution both
from within and without, and by doing so, protecting its own
interests and existence. The power to enforce the Constitution is
especially important in the context of the democratic and procedural
rights enumerated in chapter 2. Rights of the state citizens. This
authority allows the Confederation to use force against state
authorities that do not respect popular rights.
Since the power to defend itself is so fundamental to the very
existence of a governmental organization, the power of defense
would probably have been implied if not given expressly. The
express provision of section 3.5 removes any doubt that may have
existed.
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has the same right to defend itself and its institutions, and conflicts between the states
and the Confederation are still to be resolved by the constitutional tribunal. Decisions
by the tribunal will be as binding on the Confederation as the Constitution itself. In
the end, it is the Constitutional Tribunal, biased in favor of the states, that will decide
what is necessary and proper.
The difference between this necessary and proper clause and the cor-
responding clause in the U.S. constitution or the current arrangement
in the European Community treaties and other federal constitutions,
is not so much in what it says, but in who interprets what it says. In
the end it is up to the Constitutional Tribunal to provide a body of
case law that defines in detail what is meant by democratic govern-
ment, what makes up "a reasonable number of citizens", whether,
or in what circumstances the confederation can force the building of
highways, railroads or airports to ensure freedom of movement etc.,
etc.. Each of these decisions is important, but they are not "constit-
utional". They are not fundamental or constitutional principles, but
the application of fundamental principles to changing circumstances
and concrete issues.
The last subsection prevents the individual states from getting the
Confederation as a whole embroiled in external conflict. It doesn t
prevent each state from defending itself, but it does place limits on
aggressive behavior.88 Section by Section Commentary
4 Definitions and general provisions
4.1 Majority of votes cast
Section 4.1 ensures that popular and other votes are determined by
the majority of the votes cast.
4.2 Double majorities
Section 4.2 defines the term double majority. A double majority
consists of a majority of the confederate citizen s votes as well as a
majority in a majority of the states.
The use of double majorities safeguards the interests both of the
most populous and the least populous states.
4.3 Conflicting double majorities
Section 4.3 regulates the order of precedence in case the people
approve conflicting measures.
4.4 Non-contested real estate
Section 4.4 defines Non-contested real estate. Section 2.3 requires
the weighing of conflicting interests in real property. If the property
is nonresidential freedom of movement poses no conflicts, and the
right to have it withdrawn is reserved to the owner. If the property
is residential on the other hand, the owner s right of withdrawing the
property (and thus his freedom of movement) may conflict with the
residents  right not to move. (Freedom to move also implies theChapter 4. Definitions and general provisions 89
opposite freedom of not moving.) This conflict is resolved in favor
of the residents because our bodies are more essential than physical
assets.
The actual source of the problem is the linking of statehood and
territory.
4.5 Precedence
Section 4.5 expressly states that Part one of the Constitution takes
precedence over Part two. The confederate institutions as a group,
hold all the powers granted the Confederation in Part One, but they
cannot exceed these powers.
Most traditional federal or confederate constitutions do not make this
distinction between the sum of the powers granted to a particular
governmental unit (level) and the distribution of those powers
between the various branches within that unit (level).90 Section by Section Commentary
5 The President
5.1 Executive power
The executive power of the Confederation is vested in the President.
This section provides a general definition of the President s role
within the confederate institutions. This general definition is clarified
in the remainder of the chapter, especially in section 5.2.
Section 5.1 corresponds to the first part of U.S. 11.1 .1 . The remaining issues regulated
by the U.S. equivalent (the presidential term and elections) are dealt with separately
in the proposal s section 5.3.
5.2 Prerogatives
This section defines the executive power of the President. It grants
the President the position of commander-in-chief, empowers him to
appoint department heads, grant pardons, make treaties, make
proposals to state legislatures or state citizens, make proposals to
Congress, veto legislation and reduce or eliminate appropriations to
balance the confederate budget.
The proposed constitution outlines a very powerful presidency
compared with the legislature s (Congress ) powers. But as the
confederate powers themselves are relatively weak, the sum of
presidential powers are less than those of most contemporary
federations.
Because the President commonly represents the people better than
Congress, his functions as the third house of the legislature has been
extended. The veto power applies to all congressional decisions, i.e.
even to decisions that normally require a two thirds majority like
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deficits etc.. The veto can be overridden by Congress by a majority
that is 1/6 larger than that required for a decision that meets with the
approval of the President. A majority has to be increased to a two
thirds majority, and a two thirds majority has to be increased to a
five sixths majority.
The line item veto and the power to reduce appropriations provide
the President with powers similar to those of the Referendum. It
provides for the unbundling and uncoupling of spending and
legislative decisions in Congress.
Line by line comparison with the U.S. Constitution s Article II . sections
2 and 3
Subsection 5.2.2, appointment of officers, corresponds to U.S. 11.2.2 , but limits the
Senate s and the President
 s deliberations to avoid dead-lock in case of disagreement.
Subsection 5.2.3, reprieves and pardons, corresponds to U.S. 11.2.1, but limits the
President s power to grant reprieves and pardons in the case of impeachment. This
limitation is found in the U.S. II.4 .
Subsection 5.2.4 provides for the making of treaties with the consent of Congress
instead of (U.S. 11.2.2) a two thirds majority in the Senate.
Subsection 5.2.5, the right to make formal proposals to the authorities of individual
states, is a new power not granted the U.S. President.
Subsection 5.2.6, the right to make formal proposals directly to the citizens of
individual states, is a new power not granted the U.S. President.
Subsection 5.2.8, presidential veto powers, corresponds to the U.S. 1.7.3 with the
following modifications:
A) Line item veto granted,
13) Veto period extended to 30 days, and
C) Any bill or vote not approved is automatically vetoed at the end of 30
days.
An automatic veto prevents the Congress from taking measures to prevent the timely ,
return of vetoed bills.
M,
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Subsection 5.2.9, the power to reduce appropriations, is new in comparison with the
powers granted the U.S. President. It gives added flexibility in combating excessive
spending and budgetary deficits.
It also confirms the President
 s role as the people s instrument in checking the
ambitions of Congress and in reconciling the interests of geographical or other
pressure groups with those of the people as a whole. It provides a mechanism for
enforcing the balanced budget requirement.
5.3 Term and election
Section 5.3 provides for direct presidential elections and fixes the
ordinary term at 5 years. If no candidate has a majority of votes cast
in the first ballot, there is a run-off between the two candidates with
the highest number of votes.
By loosening the requirements for recall (see below), there is no reason why the
presidential term may not be further extended (see also appendix 1.2 for a discussion
of continuous elections).
The section proposes no limit on the number of terms. To the extent that this becomes
a problem it may be alleviated through a recall.
5.4 Candidates
This section has no equivalent in either the U.S. or the Swiss
constitutions. It proposes the direct nomination of candidates by
popular petitions. This makes the nomination process independent of
party politics and procedures.
The vice presidential candidate is chosen by the presidential
candidate. This corresponds to U.S. practice, but not constitutional
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5.5 Removal
Section 5.5 is modeled on the U.S. Constitution. The first subsection
states that the President is removable on impeachment. This
corresponds to a similar if not identically worded provision in U.S.
II.4.
The rest of the section corresponds to the original removal provis-
ions in the U.S. constitution (U.S. II.1.6). It enables the Congress
to provide for the swift resolution of the President s possible
inability through its powers to regulate the courts, but prevents
Congress from usurping executive or judicial powers. (The Congress
may for instance, designate the Supreme Court as having original
jurisdiction, specify time limits and special procedures for times of
war and crisis and so on.) Swiftness, flexibility and impartiality is
also better served by a small judicial body like the Supreme Court,
than by a larger body that may be prevented from assembling by the
very crisis that demands a swift resolution.
The corresponding section 11.1.6 of the U.S. constitution has since been replaced by
the twenty-fifth amendment which:
A) Unnecessarily complicates matters by variously trying to cover all
possibilities and simultaneously repeating in more complex language, what
most people would assume the original section to mean anyhow. By making
the issues more complex, the amendment may be counterproductive and
dangerous rather than helpful in a real crisis. It muddles the essentials.
B) Confers on the Congress the ultimate power of deciding whether the
President is able to discharge his powers. This encroachment of the Congress
on the powers of the judiciary is especially dangerous since it may place the
President at the mercy of Congress at that very moment, for instance during
a war or other crisis, when the executive nature of the executive powers is
most needed, and indeed for the occasion from which much of the rationale
for creating an independent executive arose. Just in times of crisis, it is even
more essential than at other times to leave these issues to the professional
levelheadedness and detachment of the judiciary; and94 Section by Section Commentary
C) Provides a means by which Congress may usurp power even if there is
no crisis. The Norwegian Parliament for instance, used the inability of the
Swedish/Norwegian king to discharge his executive powers to justify the
annulment of the union with Sweden in 1905.
Thus, safety is better served by simple rules that are flexible enough to take account
of crisis circumstances, and without encouragement for congressional usurpation of
executive power.Chapter 6. The Congress 95
6 The Congress
6.1 Legislative powers
This section, outlining the legislative powers of the People and the
Congress, corresponds to the U.S. I.1. It differs from the U.S.
Constitution on the following significant issues:
A) Legislative powers are vested in the People, i.e. in the
citizens of the Confederation, and in Congress only by
limited delegation.
B) Legislative powers are confined by Part One.
6.2 The powers of Congress
The powers of Congress follow the U.S. constitution with the
following major exceptions (see also "Legislative powers" and "The
people") :
A) Congress may only requisition emergency funds from the
states, and then only by a two thirds  majority. Ordinary
annual requisitions are decided by the people. Congress may
lay taxes only on the citizens of those states not complying
with the requisitions.
B) Congress may appropriate funds as it pleases, but if the
total exceeds confederate revenues or approved budgetary
deficits, the President may reduce or eliminate appropria-
tions. (The reasoning behind this should be obvious t
anyone following the budget debates around the world.)96 Section by Section Commentary
C) Congress may borrow money only by a two thirds
majority.
D) Congress may approve budgetary deficits only by a two
thirds majority.
E) Proposals for constitutional amendments is subject to the
veto power of the President.
F) Overriding the President s veto may sometimes require a
5/6th majority of each house.
G) The power of trying impeachments is moved to the
Supreme Court. The Senate is given the power of impeach-
ment concurrent with the House.
H) Congress is given the powers of overriding suspensions
caused by the Referendum.
6.3 The Senate
Number of senators
Until there are 25 states the determination of the number of senators
(2 from each state) corresponds to U.S. 1.3.1 and the general sense
of Switzerland Art. 80.
The rest of the section accommodates situations where there are
more than 25 states.
Election
This section corresponds to U.S. 1.4.1, but instead of giving the
ultimate power of regulating elections to the Congress, it grants this
power to the states.Chapter 6. The Congress 97
The co-sovereignty of the Confederation implies that the Con-
federation ought to decide its own election procedures. This principle
is counterbalanced by a need to provide room for innovation and
flexibility. The proposed section enables the states to adopt modes
of election according to local traditions.
6.4 The House of Representatives
The purpose of section 6.4 is to: A) Fix the number of Representa-
tives in the House of Representatives; B) Provide for reapportion-
ment according to changing state populations; and C) Fix the
maximum term for representatives.
Apportioning representatives among the states
Subsection 6.4.1 fixes the number of Representatives at 250.
Representatives are apportioned according to population. The
proposed number of representatives makes the House small enough
to be a forum of real debate and vigor, and yet large enough to
ensure diversity.
Apportionment according to population also ensures that each citizen
vote has equal value. Subsection 6.4.1 corresponds to U.S. 1.2.3. It
is similar in principle to the Australian constitution s section 24.
The subsection is not influenced by population variations (typically
increases due to population growth or the admission of new states)
The proposed apportioning of reprentatives among the states allows
a dispersed representation in a European Congress while retaining
small House of Representatives. As Figure 4 shows the Russia-.
group makes up only 41 of 250 representatives.
Redistricting and gerrymandering
The proposed constitution does not touch on the subject of redistricting within the
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Figure 4 Distribution of representatives, pan-European Confedera-
tion
states.
In principle redistricting can be viewed as reapportioning extended downward to each
individual congressional district. In the U.S , the courts have decided that congressional
districts within each state must have very nearly equal population. Similarly the
introduction of
"one vote one value   , was recommended by the Australian
Constitutional Commission 1988.
The Constitution does provide for
"one vote one value
" at the state level, but it leaves
the states free to select their own methods for internal apportioning. This flexibility
may be particularly appropriate for states deciding to pool their populations for
obtaining representation in Congress. Any deviations from one vote one value may
2 The Australian way of saying that districts must have the same
population.Chapter 6. The Congress 99
also be alleviated through a state constitutional initiative, or by the erection of a new
state. State freedom in regulating elections also implies freedom to choose between
proportional, first past the post or other election methods.100 Section by Section Commentary
7 The Supreme Court
7.1 Judicial powers
Confederate judicial powers are vested in one Supreme Court and in
inferior courts established by law. Judicial powers are limited by
section 3.3 and the regulations related to the Constitutional Tribunal.
The text of section 7.1 is modeled on the U.S. Constitution Article
III section 1 and partially on Article III section 2.
This chapter 7 follows the U.S. Constitution with the following
exceptions:
A) The courts are expressly granted the powers of judicial
review,(see section 7.2), i.e. the power to decide whether
acts of Congress are constitutional.
B) Regulations of the court system may not come into effect
until a new President has taken office (see section 7.3). This
is to prevent the blatant manipulation of the court system
attempted by Franklin D. Roosevelt in the U.S. in the 1930s.
The Supreme Court declared parts of Roosevelt s New Deal legislation for
unconstitutional. This resulted in Roosevelt threatening to expand the court
and appoint enough new justices to overrule those not bending to his will.
C) The Supreme Court is given the powers to recommend
(propose) changes in legislation regulating the courts. (See
section 7.3)Chapter 7. The Supreme Court 101
7.2 Judicial review
The power of judicial review is the power to declare ordinary laws
unconstitutional and thereby making them unenforceable. The courts
have this power in most countries relying on the Anglo-American
legal system including the U.S.A., Canada, Australia etc.. In several
European states, e.g. France and Germany, judicial review takes
place only in specialized courts or institutions. While, in still other,
like Switzerland, there is no mechanism for judicial review at the
federal level.
Countries like Switzerland instead rely on democratic processes to
produce laws that agree with the constitution.
The advantages of a process of judicial review by ordinary courts
are:
A) It is continuously available. Though a law at first sight
appears constitutional, later experience may reveal flaws in
the original assessment. Any system relying on assessing
constitutionality only once at the outset, lacks the ability of
considering these later developments.
B) Judicial review by the courts ensures a more thorough,
reliable and certain review than the democratic process alone.
In essence, the people delegate to the courts the duty cf
acting as a watchdog in relation to possible encroachments on
the Constitution by the executive and the legislative. Th
is
does not, of course, mean that the courts and the voters will
always be in agreement. The courts ought to interpret
Constitution as it is, while the people may want a different
constitution. An independent judiciary process ensures
any deficiencies in the Constitution are forced out into
open, where they can be examined and amended directly d y102 Section by Section Commentary
the voters.
7.3 Original jurisdiction and right of appeal
See section 7.1 above.Chapter 8. The People 103
8 The People
8.1 Requisitioning
Section 8.1 provides for the people itself to decide directly what
level of taxation it wants to incur. This can be done by Dutch
auction due to the simplified nature of confederate financing as an
annual per capita charge on the states.
Experience from Switzerland and the United States suggests that constitutional
amendments restraining the raising of revenues enjoy widespread support, and can be
expected to enter the Constitution if the people have the power of the constitutional
initiative. Given that such restraints are to enter the Constitution anyhow, the real
question is what form they ought to have.
The proposed section has the advantage of simplicity, from the point of view both of
the electorate and of their representatives. It is also highly flexible, allowing the
raising and lowering of taxes depending on popular opinion.
In addition the proposed section uncouples aggregate taxation from spending on
particular projects. This provides an additional hurdle for spending and reduces overall
taxation.
The Congress is empowered to raise emergency funds in case of war or crisis.
The annual charge may be reset any time, but has to be reset at least
every 5 years.
8.2 The Initiative
Section 8.2 regulates the people s power to propose and enact
legislation of any kind except constitutional amendments which are
separately regulated in section 8.6, confer also section 1 .9,i
,
Ill Most of this section follows the standard pattern for initiatives, with
 
IÎ the following exceptions:
it For reasons of practicality, Initiatives may be lumped with
elections so that the voters don t have to go to the polling
1111 N places several times a year. Subsection 8.1.3 taken with
section 9.3, provides that Initiatives has to be decided within
465 days (100 days + 1 year).
Decisions require a double majority (a majority of the
popular votes and a majority of the states). This ensures that
confederate legislation enjoys broad support.
Legislation enacted directly by the voters may be amended
after 5 years.
Experience in the U.S. suggests that legislatures has to be prevented from nullifying
the decisions of the people by repealing or amending statutes enacted by the initiative.
On the other hand, if initiative legislation is absolutely protected, it is unable to adopt
to changing circumstances.
In California direct legislation may only be changed by new direct legislation. This has
partly led to obsolete legislation remaining on the books, and partly to the voters being
overwhelmed by proposals for minor amendments.
The 5 year limit is a compromise between these two opposing considerations. After
5 years, at least there will have been a renewal of the House of Representatives and
in the presidency, possibly also in the Senate. This limits, but does not eliminate, the
first consideration.
8.3 The Referendum
Section 8.3 regulates the people s power to approve or reject any
bill or act of Congress. This section follows the usual pattern for
petition referendums with the following exception (see also com-
ments on the Initiative):
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The referendum, as defined in this document, does not imply
a vote on whether to veto an act of Congress; Instead, it
implies a vote on the proposed legislation itself. This means
that legislation not expressly approved is rejected.
8.4 The Recall
Section 8.4 regulates the people s power to end the term of any
elected public official. The recall of elected officials, cannot be
found either in the U.S. or Swiss constitutions, but can be found in
state constitutions in the U.S.. It provides a safety valve short of
removal by impeachment. Additionally, it puts this power in the
hands of the people instead of elected officials.
Recall is the most recent invention in the field of direct democracy, following the
introduction of the referendum and the initiative. Although it is rarely used, this may
not reflect its real importance. After all, the instrument of impeachment is even less
used, but its existence and the implication that it might be used played a crucial role
in forcing the resignation of former U.S. President Richard Nixon.
The lesser use of the recall may also be related to the fact that the qualification
requirements for recalls are usually much stricter that for the initiative or the
referendum.
By loosening the qualification requirements for recall, longer terms for elected officials
might become increasingly attractive and possible as the recall takes on the character
of being an ordinary and acceptable way of making a change of officials.
How or whether to use the recall is, however, a decision best left to the people itself
through popular resetting of the qualification requirements.
The proposed recall provision forces a new election. Some state
provisions in the U.S. uses a two-step procedure; First the recall
itself, and then if successful, a new election. This procedure is more
c
umbersome and therefore less desirable.106 Section by Section Commentary
To ensure multiple candidates, candidates at the prior election
qualify immediately. Qualification requirements for other candidates
will depend on legislation.
8.5 Qualifying Initiatives, Referendums and Recalls
Section 8.5 regulates the procedure for setting the number of
signatures (voters) required to qualify Initiatives, Referendums and
recalls. It has no equivalent in other constitutions.
One method employed by legislatures to get rid of the perceived impertinent intrusion
of the voters has been to raise signature requirements to unrealistically high numbers.
Instead of specifying a number or percentage that may later be challenged and
changed, the proposed model relies on a self-adjusting process so this issue may be
decided by the voters themselves from time to time.
If the people feel that the number of Initiatives, Referendums or Recalls is inadequate,
they get the chance of reducing the qualifying number of petitioners. If on the other
hand, the number of Initiatives, Referendums or Recalls is excessive, qualifying
requirements may be adjusted upwards.
One objection to direct legislation has been that the people quickly
become swamped by irrelevant proposals. On the other hand, if the
hurdle is too high, important issues may not get voted on. The
proposed procedure alleviates these concerns by leaving the decision
directly with the people itself.
8.6 The Constitutional Initiative
Section 8.6 regulates the people s power to propose and enact
amendments to Part Two of the Constitution. This section cor-
responds to the Swiss Art. 121, and to many equivalent amending
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The Constitutional Initiative has more stringent requirements than the
statutory initiative. These requirements encourage ordinary statutory
issues to be decided by statute and discourage the Swiss practice of
putting everything into the Constitution. The disadvantage of a large
and complex constitution is among other things, lesser accessibility.
Complex constitutions also make legislation less amenable to
changing circumstances and obscures the difference between rules
related to decision making and the outcome of individual decisions.
Constitutional amendments to part two of the Constitution are
decided by a 55% majority of the popular votes and a majority of
state votes. This gives the constitutional amendment a broader basis
than the statute, but is less stringent than amendments to Part One
of the Constitution.
8.7 Confederate and state initiated direct legislation
Section 8.7 gives confederate institutions or state legislatures the
right to initiate direct legislation. Such initiatives may be in direct
response to popular initiatives.
Both in Switzerland and in the U.S.A. it is common for legislatures
to present their own competing and often moderated, versions of
voter initiatives. Quite often these "official" alternatives win out
either because they are better drafted or because they are less
extreme.108 Section by Section Commentary
9 Bill of Rights
9.1 Applicability
The purpose of section 9.1 is to make the Bill of Rights expressly
binding on all confederate institutions, and to provide a safety net for
state legislation. If state law is silent, confederate law and the
confederate bill of rights will extend also to state institutions and
within state jurisdictions.
On the other hand, states that want to modify the Bill of Rights to
local circumstances are free to do so, confer section 1.4 Superior
law.
9.2 Non-discrimination
Section 9.2 prevents discrimination due to nationality or ethnic
origin, political or religious beliefs, race, color or sex.
9.3 Voting age
Section 9.3 extends the right to vote to all citizens older than
eighteen years.
9.4 Ex post facto law
Section 9.4 prohibits the use of ex post facto laws.Chapter 9. Bill of Rights 109
9.5 Religious freedom
Section 9.5 ensures the peaceful enjoyment of religious activities.
9.6 Freedom of speech
Section 9.6 follows the U.S. Constitution, 1st amendment, but it has
been expanded to provide for the freedom of other media than the
printed press.
Also, it has been expanded to provide for the protection of media
ownership, production and distribution. This is to prevent factual
censorship by for instance, the well-tried methods of limiting
newsprint supplies or refusing distribution; both methods popular
with authoritarian regimes.
Similar protection has been provided for the newer media.
Transfer of access rights
Section 9.6 also provides for the unrestricted ownership of and
transferal of access rights such as for instance, electromagnetic
frequency rights.
Distribution in the newer media is qualitatively different from the older media like the
press. There is no physical limit on the number of printing presses, and the fact that
The Observer owns a printing press, does not prevent The Financial Times from
owning a press too. However, radio and television broadcasting is different. If BBC
uses a particular frequency, that prevents Sky Channel from using the same frequency
without garbling up the messages of both channels.
There is a limited number of broadcasting bands available. The number may change
over time due to technical refinements in broadcasting technology, but it can never
become infinite. In fact, as technology advances it looks as if the relative availability
of frequency bands decreases. Not only is the demand rapidly increasing from
ind
ependent broadcasters, but also from modern two-way communication technology110 Section by Section Commentary
(radio, mobile telephones, pagers, satellites, etc.) that is expanding rapidly into the
same limited frequency range.
Thus frequency rights have to be allocated among several contenders. Government has
traditionally used this allocation as an excuse for regulating the contents of what is
transmitted and for censoring the media themselves.
The constitution proposes two remedies:
A) Access rights are separated from freedom of speech, or the right to start
new media. (Thus anyone may start a television channel, just like anyone
may start a newspaper.)
B) Access rights are made freely transferable. Once the access right has been
created, it may be bought and sold freely. Access rights may be created
either by government involvement as for electromagnetic frequency rights,
or by private enterprise, as for distribution rights in a cable network. In
effect, instead of being dependent on governmental privilege, access rights
have become property like any other property.
This section does not by itself compel the government to sell off access rights.
Provided the Confederation possesses all rights initially it could take over all
broadcasting itself and create a confederate monopoly. However, such a monopoly
would be unlawful according to the Bill of Rights. Thus in effect, the Confederation
may not conspire to restrict the freedom of the media. (Though each state would, in
a limited fashion, be able to do so within its borders.)
9.7 Right of assembly and association
Section 9.7 protects the right of assembly and association.
9.8 Habeas corpus
Section 9.8 corresponds to U.S. 1.9.2. However, while the U.S.
clause provides for the suspension of Habeas Corpus in times of
rebellion or invasion, the proposed clause does not. In those rare
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or during a complete break-down of civil authority, the suspension
will come about automatically, as the courts will be unable to sit,
and therefore will be unable to issue the writ. Thus there is no
reason for a constitutional loop-hole and it may be potentially
dangerous to provide a mechanism by which other authorities than
the courts themselves decide either whether detention is justified or
whether the danger to public safety requires the general suspension
of Habeas Corpus.
During the Second World War tens of thousands of U.S. citizens of Japanese origin
were detained without conviction or indeed without even being accused of a crime.
Only recently has the U.S. government taken steps to remedy this gross injustice
through monetary compensation to the estimated remaining approximately 67.000
victims. The legal basis for this suspension of basic rights was the risk to public safety
cited in U.S. 1.9.2.
9.9 Privacy, searches, seizures, and interceptions
Section 9.9 protects the people s right to privacy. This section is
based on the U.S. Constitution 4th amendment, with the following
exceptions and modifications:
A) It starts by a positive declaration of what is to be protec-
ted, the privacy of the individual. This positive declaration
supports a broader interpretation of the rest of the section
(for instance to take account of advances in technology).
B) The term searches and seizures is expanded to include
interception (for instance wire tapping).
C) The section also includes information and communi-
cations.112 Section by Section Commentary
D) The proposed section also protects against private parties
to take account of increasingly sophisticated electronic and
other gadgetry available to private parties and organizations.
Typical private parties are neighbors, news organizations and
employers.
E) Restrictions apply independently of where the seizure
takes place. The actual interception of phone calls, for
instance, will normally take place outside your home.
It is impossible for the public to evaluate whether there is probable
cause in each instance. Through the publication of statistics and the
admission of compensation the proposed section introduces a process
that discourages non-legitimate searches.
9.10 Due process
This section is based on the U.S. Constitution 5th amendment, but
also provides for compensation for those wrongfully detained or
convicted.
9.11 Criminal prosecutions
Section 9.11 protects individuals in criminal prosecutions. It is a
combination of parts from U.S. Bill of Rights safeguards and
Supreme Court decisions (Miranda warnings).
Section 9.11 clarifies the expression due process of law in criminal
cases.N
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9.12 Jury
Section 9.12 protects the people s right to trial by jury.
9.13 Excessive bail
Section 9.13 protects the people against excessive bail, excessive
damages and cruel and unusual punishments.
9.14 Taking of property
Section 9.14 protects individuals against arbitrary confiscation. Com-
pared with the U.S. and most other taking clauses the proposed
section also gives full instead of just compensation and includes
regulations.
Full or just compensation
The difference between full and just compensation is that full compensation will
always be just, while just compensation may not always be full. Full compensation is
always the larger figure of several possible combinations either of which could
conceivably be termed just compensation. Possible basis for full or just compensations
are: original cost, inflation adjusted cost, book-value (in case of business entities), net
present value (based on income stream from property), market value, replacement
value and sentimental value.
Additional questions that are not answered by this clause: If the value of the property
is higher to the government than to the original owner, should this higher value be
used as a basis? Should effects caused by the expropriation itself be considered? A
constitutional clause does not answer all questions, legislation or common law is still
required to fill the blanks.
Regulations
Regulations are probably more important economically than the
actual taking of property in the narrow sense. In most countries, the114 Section by Section Commentary
author does not know of any exceptions, government may impose
restrictions without paying compensation. Since this mode is "free"
(at least to government), zoning and other regulations proliferate.
The proposed remedy has two objectives:
A) Provide compensation to property owners according to the
losses suffered by regulations, and
B) Providing governments with cost figures, so that there is
a basis for trade-offs between costs and benefits. Potential
savings due to an intelligent trade-off between the costs and
benefits of governmental regulation may easily run into tens
of billions of ECU for the European Community, and
possibly into hundreds of billions of ECU. These are savings
larger than those envisioned by the single market reforms.
Instead of declaring un-necessary regulations unlawful; the proposal
relies on a flexible mechanism by which government may regulate
without limit; as long as it pays the actual costs.
The issue is also depoliticized. Instead of haggling over whether a
regulation is necessary or not, we can leave it to the accountants,
economists and legal system to figure out the cost, and then decide
whether we believe the costs outweigh the benefits or vice versa.
Compensation can be paid out either through the court system, or
through automatic compensation plans relying on legislation. The
depoliticized approach also allows continual refinement as more
information becomes available.
Safety regulations
Forcing government and politicians to include all costs has important positive
consequences for safety regulations.
Let us take the licensing of medicines as an example. Regulations requiring extensive
testing of medicines before marketing have three essential cost components: a) the cost
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revenues from selling the medication are delayed, and c) the cost to patients in terms
of money and suffering, perhaps even death, while they await the release of the
medication. C) is related to b) since the revenue to be expected by the manufacturer
relates directly to the alleviated suffering. Manufacturers of medicine can expect to
recoup their costs and earn a profit only if they sell expensive medicines to patients
suffering from very serious diseases (AIDS for instance), or if they sell inexpensive
medicines relieving many patients of minor suffering (e.g. cough medicine). Thus the
suffering of the patients while they await release corresponds to a revenue loss for the
manufacturer. On the other side of the ledger, we find that extensive testing also has
benefits as seen by the manufacturer; It protects him against the economic con-
sequences, in terms of compensation to victims, of releasing a medicine with serious
defects. From the patients  point of view it reduces the likelihood of injuries and
suffering from the un-anticipated medical effects. This latter cost is again included in
the manufacturer
 s cost, as he must compensate victims of unanticipated effects.
It is important to note that the pharmaceutical company will only be able to claim
compensation if the net costs associated with complying with regulations exceed the
company
 s net benefits. Often this will not be the case, and regulations can be retained
as they are. Compensation related to safety regulations will only be possible when
requirements go beyond what is sensible. For instance, many countries do not
distinguish between medication for fatal and non-fatal diseases. Medication for AIDS
has to go through the same lengthy test procedure as cough medicine. This does not
make sense. If you are already dead, it is of no use that the medication you could have
taken to stay alive is "safe". In this case the pharmaceutical company s potential
liability for unanticipated effects is very small as its potential customers would have
died anyway. The potential revenues on the other hand, may be significant as people
are willing to pay quite a lot for staying alive. The net loss to the pharmaceutical
company due to regulation is large. Through the courts the pharmaceutical company
will be able to claim a significant compensation. This will show up as a significant
expense in the confederate budget, and will encourage greater regulatory differentia-
tion. Thus instead of encouraging a colder and less humane society, inclusion of
regulatory costs will encourage politicians and governmental organizations to act more
humanely.
Breaking up or regulating cartels and monopolistic organizations
There is considerable disagreement among knowledgeable people whether it is possible
for a country to regulate itself free from the negative economic effects of cartels and
mo
nopolies. Experience from several countries suggests that the effect of regulations
often turns out to be the opposite of those intended: Instead of increased competition
we may get additional regulatory barriers of entry, and instead of competitive be
havior, we may get government sponsored collusion. A typical example of the latter116 Section by Section Commentary
kind can be found in the American regulations related to
"fair
" (whatever that means)
foreign competition. In the name of fair competition American authorities have
sponsored
"voluntary
" restraining agreements among Japanese manufacturers of
automobiles and semiconductors. In effect the American government is condoning a
cartel of Japanese manufacturers so as to reduce competition in the American market
and raise prices.
Nevertheless, given that we are to have anti-trust regulation (which in theory is
different from trade regulations), it can only be justified to the extent that it returns
monopolistic profits to customers. This puts the injured party (the customer) in the
position he would have been in if the monopoly or cartel didn t exist. The result of
monopolistic coercion is counteracted by governmental coercion and this is its
justification. The monopolist is forced to repay a gain he has come by not necessarily
through a fault of himself, but through an unfair process. It is like finding a suitcase
of money on the subway. Though you didn t come by this money illegally, you are
obliged to return them to their rightful owner. Neither the government nor the
customer can demand anything more from a monopolist that has reached his position
honestly by out-competing his rivals. As far as economic efficiency is concerned, it
is sufficient for monopolistic profits to be returned to customers. Any regulation that
goes beyond this without providing compensation is neither justifiable on grounds of
equity nor on economic efficiency grounds. The second subsection encourages the
courts to monitor anti-trust and anti-cartel legislation to make sure that it does no
more than intended and is justifiable on the grounds of economic efficiency and equity.
It is not always possible to find practical ways of counteracting the effects of
monopolies and near-monopolies, and often the costs involved may not be worth the
effort. The government may compel you to try to find the owner of a suitcase full of
money or at least deposit the money at the nearest police station. It hardly seems
worthwhile to compel citizens to spend the same amount of effort on a dime (10 cent
piece) found on the streets of New York or a lop piece found on the streets of
London. Thus it is sufficient for the Constitution to give the Confederation the option
of regulating these issues. It should not compel regulation.
9.15 Speedy decisions
The purpose of section 9.15 is to prevent the government from
achieving through stalling what could not be achieved otherwise, and
to provide an incentive for government to act by putting the burden
of delay on government instead of on each citizen.Chapter 9. Bill of Rights 117
The cost to individuals of government stalling
The everyday life of ordinary people has become increasingly dependent on
government permits and decisions. These permits are not usually a matter of life and
death, but they may make the difference between prosperity and bankruptcy.
Sometimes the executive branch may achieve an objective beyond its stated powers
simply by delaying the necessary paper-work. Delaying action may be just as effective
as outright refusal and much harder to alleviate through the court system which itself
is overburdened. However, usually it is not a question of malice, but simply a lack of
governmental resources. Governments and politicians rarely weigh the supposed
advantages to society of a thorough investigation against the interests of the individual
seeking a permit, and they have no incentive to do so.
The need for rules to prevent government stalling also has to do with the government  s
monopoly position. Any business refusing to serve its customers within reasonable
time, would simply go out of business, as people would go elsewhere. This option is
not available in the case of the confederate government.
9.16 Equalprotection
The purpose of this section is to ensure that all citizens, including
confederate officials, are equal before the law and enjoy the equal
protection of the laws.
As some governmental functions by nature, require immunity, the
real purpose of this section is to transfer the evaluation of what
makes up necessary privileges and immunities from the officials
themselves to the judicial system. The advantages associated with
this approach has to do with the relative dangers to equality and in-
dividual liberty associated with the various branches of government.
Because courts are reactive rather than active (they only decide
issues brought before them) they pose less of a threat to the public
than either the executive or the legislative.118 Section by Section Commentary
Examples of privileges gone wrong
Members of the legislature as the new privileged class
The original function of Parliamentarian privileges was to protect the Parliamentarians
against a powerful non-elected executive. Typically, MPs had complete freedom of
speech, i.e. not even subject to libel, freedom from arrest during sessions etc..
However, as the need for such privileges has diminished, they have nevertheless at
least sometimes, been strengthened.
In Sweden, Parliament has recently enacted an insider trading statute, but simultan-
eously the Swedish Parliament also exempted itself from the same statute. (Source:
"Innsidelov ikke for Riksdagen
", Dagens Næringsliv, Oslo, September 22, 1990). It
is hard to see how this exemption can be justified by the need for protecting the
democratic process.
In Norway, Parliament enacted an anti-smoking statute, only to try to have itself
exempted. Similarly it is quite common for MPs to have special tax privileges. Though
Norwegian MPs rarely pay their own way when travelling, their tax-free travel
allowances are double everybody else s allowances. These legal exceptions are not
individually important, but taken together they show many politicians  disrespect for
democratic processes and for the people that elected them.
Sovereign immunity
More directly important may be the idea of sovereign immunity found in varying
degrees in many countries. In the United Kingdom for instance, the executive
government (the Crown) may not be sued. On the continent there is an extensive body
of administrative law that similarly protects the government and government officials.
The U.S. Atomic Energy Commission
In the United States the Atomic Energy Commission in the 1950s operated uranium
mines in Colorado and other western states of the U.S.. In spite of warnings from the
U.S. Public Health Service advocating better ventilation, the AEC failed to act because
it was afraid of alerting the miners to the dangers associated with uranium mining.
Eventually many miners developed lung cancer, but when they sued, the court ruled
that the government was protected by sovereign immunity. (Source: "These people
were used as guinea pigs", International Business Week, October 22, 1990, page 64
B-E and 64 C-E).
It is instructive to compare the AEC case with the asbestos cases in the U.S.. Manville
Co., the world
 s largest manufacturer of asbestos, was eventually forced to pay
compensation to asbestos victims though it didn t know and could not have known at
the time of the sale that asbestos poised a health risk. The AEC got off without anyChapter 9. Bill of Rights 119
liability although it deliberately avoided taking protective measures.
9.17 Monopolies
The objective of this section is to ensure that the confederate
government does not achieve through a monopolistic arrangement
what it cannot achieve through legislation. Governmental monopolies
may for instance be an alternate method for raising revenues. In this
respect it may act as a substitute for taxes. Similarly, monopolies
may be used to introduce or maintain regulations that would
otherwise have been illegal. This section makes it harder for the
Confederation to exempt itself from competitive pressures.
The second subsection protects patents, copyrights etc..
9.18 Rights retained by the people
The purpose of this section is to provide the courts with a means of
enforcing rights that are generally accepted, but have been omitted
from the Constitution either by accident or by design. The U.S.
constitution for instance, has clauses relating to slavery and involun-
tary servitude. The idea of slavery, however, is so foreign to current
thinking that putting it in would be to give it more attention than it
deserves.120 Section by Section Commentary
10 General Provisions of part two
10.1 Election day
The establishment of an election day has two purposes:
A) To prevent the government from depriving the citizens of their
right of democratic government by postponing elections.
There are unfortunately, many instances where even democratically elected
governments have used this and similar tactics. In the United States there are many
cases of state legislatures designating ordinary legislation as emergency legislation to
prevent it from being subject to a referendum. Similarly, in Switzerland during and
after the Second World War the Swiss government enacted several highly unpopular
measures and prevented the people from exercising their right of referendum. The
Swiss eventually amended their Constitution to preclude similar occurrences in the
future.
B) To simplify voting by enabling the voters to decide several issues
with only one visit to the polling place.
Experience seems to show that if too many visits to the polling place is required
throughout the year, a certain amount of voter fatigue sets in. (This may of course,
be alleviated by the introduction of technology or methods that allows the people to
vote without having to show up at a certain place at a certain time.)
10.2 Limit on other office of profit
The purpose of this clause is to protect the separation of powers, and
prevent the corruption of legislators. Without this clause, the
President for instance, may bribe legislators by offering them
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10.3 Compensation
This section corresponds to U.S. II.1.7 which employs the same
mechanism to enjoin the U.S. President from being party to the
determination of his own compensation. Each President s compensa-
tion is in effect determined by his predecessor and by Congress.
The clause is expanded to include senators, representatives and other
elected public officials.
10.4 Sunset clause
Section 10.4 serves three purposes: A) It ensures that obsolete
statutes are taken off the books, B) It restores separation of powers,
and C) It reduces long-term effects of special circumstances.
Removes obsolete statutes
Statutes accumulate continuously. This section ensures that obsolete
statutes are taken off the books, and that other statutes are examined
from time to time to bring them up to date with changes in society.
The 35 year period represents about one generation which seems a
reasonable interval.
Restores separation of powers
In a federal or confederate system of government or in a system of
government relying on multiple independent branches there is a
further advantage in a sunset clause. It undoes any shifts in powers
caused by legislation.
Without a sunset clause, there is for instance, a strong tendency for
the executive s powers to be compromised over time in relation to





122 Section by Section Commentary
Reduces long-term effects of special circumstances
Similarly there is a tendency for central governmental powers to
increase at the expense of individual states and citizens. A sunset
clause will, to a certain extent, alleviate this problem by eliminating
those encroachments tolerated by the courts due to special cir-
cumstances. For instance, during times of war or crisis, the people
and the courts will tolerate statutes and the interpretation of statutes
that in times of peace would have been inconceivable. The sunset
clause increases the likelihood that these measures will eventually get
off the books again when circumstances change.
10.5 Sunrise clause
The purpose of this section is to minimize legislative interference
with the referendum.
10.6 Confederate budget
The purpose of this clause is to make it more difficult for the
President and the Congress to embark on creative budgeting.
The inclusion of provisions for contingent liabilities, eliminates or
reduces the budgetary "gains" of off-budget financing. The inclusion
of provisions for obligations payable in the future, is intended to
make sure that each Congress pays its own way. (It minimizes the
budgetary consequences of Louis XV like attitudes: "After me, the
deluge.")
The carry-forward of accumulated deficits reduces the effects of
eternally optimistic program cost estimates. (Similar fudging of the
confederate revenues is not possible, as they are determined directly
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10.7 Constitutional convention
The purpose of the constitutional convention is not to propose an
entirely new constitution, but to provide a forum for the periodic
more systematic evaluation of the text of the constitution. The
purpose is to provide the same critical assessment of constitutional
clauses as the sunset clause provides for ordinary legislation.Part One (The Compact) 127
Part One (The Compact)
1 State powers and privileges
1.1 Sovereignty
Each state is independent and sovereign. It retains all such freedoms,
powers, jurisdictions, rights and privileges not expressly delegated
to the Confederation.
1.2 Defense
Each state has the right to maintain its own defense forces and the
right to defend itself against actual invasion. No state s military
forces may enter another state without that state s consent.
1.3 Secession
Each state has the right to secede from the Confederation on the
direct vote of its citizens.
1.4 Superior law
Subject to part one (the compact) of this constitution and each state s
jurisdiction, state laws and treaties are superior to confederate laws
and treaties.
1.5 State assumption of a confederate service
Each state has the right to take over or discontinue the provision of
a confederate task or service within its jurisdiction. The state shall
receive a financial compensation from the Confederation equal to the
Confederation s realizable savings.
1.6 Treaty powers
Each state retains the right to make treaties with any other state or
foreign state, provided that such treaties either shall be made for a128 The Constitution
fixed term shorter than 35 years or with a notice of termination
shorter than 3 years. Treaties may not contain secret clauses.
1.7 Regional bodies
1.7.1 Two or more states may, by treaty, establish a regional
body and grant it part of their powers and privileges
according to this constitution.
1.7.2 The founding treaty shall enumerate those regional powers
and privileges to be enjoyed concurrently with the member
states and those powers and privileges exclusive to the
regional body.
1.7.3 Each state may be a member of any number of regional
bodies as long as their powers or privileges do not conflict,
or can be made not to conflict, with each other, or with
those of each state.
1.7.4 Regional bodies may be non-contiguous.
1.7.5 Regional bodies enjoy constitutional protection.
1.7.6 Regional bodies are bound by this constitution, concurrent
with, and on the same terms as each state.
1.8 The constitutional tribunal
1.8.1 Conflicts between one or more states and the Confederation
shall be referred to the constitutional tribunal for final
decision.
1.8.2 The tribunal shall, in each instance, consist of 9 judges
drawn by lot from the candidates of the tribunal.
1.8.2.1 The candidates of the tribunal shall consist of 5 judges
selected from the supreme court of each state by that state.
1.8.2.2 When selected they shall remain as candidates during good
behavior.
1.8.2.3 They shall receive for their services a compensation, which
shall not be diminished during their continuance as a
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1.8.3 The tribunal shall maintain no offices in the capital of the
Confederation, neither must its proceedings take place in the
capital.
1.9 Amendments to Part One (The Compact)
1.9.1 The power to propose amendments to this constitution
affecting the freedoms, powers, privileges, independence or
sovereignty of the individual states, including amendments
to any section of part one (the compact), shall be the
exclusive privilege of each state.
1.9.2 To qualify for the ballot, such proposed amendment must be
supported by at least one third of the states or by states that
together have at least one third of the total population of the
Confederation.
1.9.3 Proposals must be submitted to the citizens for decision
within 465 days.
1.9.4 The proposed amendment shall be approved by a double
majority of 60%, with each state s vote being equal.
1.9.5 Notwithstanding the previous subsection, no amendment to
part one (the compact) becomes binding on or in relation to
a state whose citizens have not approved the amendment.
2 Rights of the state citizens
2.1 Citizenship
Each state citizen is also a citizen of the Confederation.
2.2 Democratic government
Each state citizen has the right to:
2.2.1 vote on the state constitution and amendments thereto
2.2.2 propose constitutional amendments
2.2.3 qualify a proposed constitutional amendment by having it
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2.2.4 submit a qualified proposed constitutional amendment to the
state citizens for decision
2.3 Freedom of movement
Each citizen has the right to:
2.3.1 leave any state and bring with him property of any kind
2.3.2 transit through any state and bring with him property of any
kind
2.3.3 withdraw from any state s territory any of his non-con-
tested real estate that has been accepted by another state
2.4 Privileges and immunities
2.4.1 The citizens of each state shall be entitled to all privileges
and immunities of citizens in the several states.
2.4.2 Notwithstanding the previous subsection, the right of a
naturalized citizen to settle in a state other than the one of
which he is a citizen may be regulated by the states or by
the Confederation.
2.5 Self-determination
2.5.1 The right of self-determination is the citizens  right to erect
a new state either within the boundaries of an existing state
or by the amalgamation of two or more states or parts of
states.
2.5.2 Any citizen qualified to vote may sponsor a draft proposal
for the erection of a new state. The draft shall describe the
boundaries of the proposed new state.
2.5.3 To qualify for the ballot, the draft proposal shall fulfill the
requirements of a state constitutional initiative. The re-
quirements shall be adjusted for consistency with their
application to the proposed new state. Signature require-
ments shall be apportioned according to the number of
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2.5.4 The erection of a new state is decided by the confederate
citizens resident within the boundaries of the proposed new
state.
2.5.5 If erected the new state comes into existence as a member
state of the Confederation.
2.5.6 A resident confederate citizen automatically becomes a state
citizen unless he elects to retain his existing state citizen-
ship.
2.5.7 All real estate within the proposed boundaries becomes part
of the territory of the newly erected state, except that the
owner of non-contested real estate may elect to retain his
existing territorial affiliation.
2.5.8 Decisions relating to the amalgamation of two or mores
states follow the rules for constitutional amendments within
each state.
3 Confederate powers and privileges
3.1 Sovereignty
The Confederation is co-sovereign with the several states.
3.2 The right of making proposals
The Confederation has the right of proposing new state laws or state
treaties of any kind or changes to each state s existing laws, treaties
and constitution. If not approved by the state within 200 days, the
Confederation may put the proposal to the direct vote of the citizens
of the state for determination.
3.3 Judicial powers
3.3.1 Subject to the states  treaty powers and the constitutional
tribunal, the Confederation has the right to resolve by
legislation, treaty or by trial, all disputes between states,
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citizens of different states and disputes involving foreign
citizens or foreign states.
3.3.2 Subject to the constitutional tribunal, the Confederation has
the right to try all disputes related to chapter 2 Rights of the
state citizens.
3.4 Legislative powers
3.4.1 Within the limits of this constitution, the Confederation has
general legislative powers and treaty powers.
3.4.2 The Confederation may requisition funds from the states
apportioned according to population. Such levy may be
enforced by direct taxes on the citizens of non-complying
states. The Confederation has no other rights of taxation.
3.5 The right to enforce and defend the constitution
3.5.1 The Confederation may use any means necessary and proper
to enforce and defend this constitution and the several
states.
3.5.2 No state s military forces may leave the territory of the
several states without the consent of the Confederation.
4 Definitions and general provisions
4.1 Majority of votes cast
All votes shall be determined by the majority of the votes cast unless
expressly stated otherwise.
4.2 Double majorities
A double majority or a qualified double majority has to fulfill two
requirements: A) It must constitute a majority (qualified majority) of
the votes cast by the citizens of the Confederation and B) it must
constitute an equal majority (majority or qualified majority) of the
state votes, where each state s vote equals the majority outcome of
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4.3 Conflicting double majorities
Conflicts between decisions that have been made at the same ballot
by double majority, shall first be resolved according to the number
of affirmative state votes. Conflicts between decisions receiving the
same number of state votes shall be resolved according to the
number of affirmative votes cast by the citizens of the Confede-
ration.
4.4 Non-contested real estate
Non-contested real estate is either non-residential real estate or
residential real estate where a majority of the residents concur with
the owner s decision.
4.5 Precedence
4.5.1 Part one (the compact) of this constitution takes precedence
over part two (confederate institutions).
4.5.2 The confederate institutions collectively hold, no more and
no less, than the confederate powers and privileges granted
in Part one (the compact).
4.6 Ratification
This constitution comes into effect between the ratifying states, when
ratified by 5 states.134 The Constitution
Part Two (Confederate Institutions)
5 The President
5.1 Executive power
The executive power of the Confederation shall be vested in the
President.
5.2 Prerogatives
The President has the power to:
5.2.1 direct the joint defense forces of the Confederation as
commander in chief
5.2.2 appoint all officers, department heads, ambassadors, public
ministers and judges with the consent of the Senate, unless
delegated or otherwise provided for by law or herein.
5.2.2.1 If the Senate fails to confirm the President s nominee
within 15 days, he shall be deemed to have been rejec-
ted.
5.2.2.2If the Senate successively rejects 3 presidential nominees,
the nominee with the highest number of affirmative votes
shall be appointed, provided that the President may
decide if the votes are equal.
5.2.2,3 During the recess of the Senate, the President may make
temporary appointments to expire no later than 60 days
after the start of the Senate s next session
5.2.3 grant reprieves and pardons for offenses against the Con-
federation excepting removal from office in case of im-
peachment
5.2.4 make treaties with the consent of Congress
5.2.5 make proposals to the legislatures or appropriate authorities
of the individual states with the consent of either the Senate
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5.2.6 make proposals directly to the citizens of the individual
states with the consent of Congress.
5.2.7 make proposals to the Congress of any kind.
5.2.8 veto, in part or in whole, any bill, order, resolution or vote
of Congress within 30 days of its passage. No law enacted
by Congress may come into effect without the express
approval of the President or a majority in each house
sufficient to override his veto.
5.2.9 reduce or eliminate appropriations at any time prior to or
during the fiscal year if necessary to balance the confederate
budget or keep the deficit within approved limits.
5.3 Term and election
The President shall be elected directly by the citizens of the
Confederation for a term of five years. If no person has a majority,
the President shall be elected by a second ballot among the two
candidates with the highest number of votes in the first ballot.
5.4 Candidates
5.4.1 Presidential candidates are nominated by the citizens of the
Confederation by a petition signed by 5 percent of the
number of citizens required for the initiative, or by such
lower number determined by law. No more than half the
number of petitioners for each candidate may be citizens of
the same state.
5.4.2 Each presidential candidate chooses a candidate for Vice
President to be elected together with the presidential
candidate for the same term. The presidential candidate and
his chosen vice presidential candidate may not be citizens of
the same state.
5.5 Removal
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5.5.2 In case of the removal of the President from office, or of
his death, resignation, or inability to discharge the powers
and duties of said office, the Vice President shall become
President or acting President, and the Congress or the
People may by law provide for the case of removal, death,
resignation or inability, both of the President and Vice




The legislative powers of the Confederation shall be vested in the
People. The People have granted Congress, consisting of a Senate
and a House of Representatives, limited concurrent powers as
enumerated.
6.2 The powers of Congress
6.2.1 Each house of Congress has the power to:
6.2.1.1 elect its own officers.
6.2.1.2 regulate its own proceedings unless established by law or
herein, including the dates of assembly and adjournment.
If there is disagreement regarding assembly and adjourn-
ment between the two houses, the issue is settled by the
President.
6.2.1.3 impeach. Impeachments shall be tried by the Supreme
Court unless a judge of the Supreme Court shall be tried,
in which case he shall be tried by a tribunal selected at
random from among the justices of the supreme courts of
the states.
6.2.2 Congress has the power to:
6.2.2.1 lay direct taxes on the citizens of states not complying
with ordinary or emergency requisitions.
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6.2.2.3 enact statutes of any kind except as otherwise provided
for herein.
6.2.2.4 constitute tribunals inferior to the Supreme Court and
regulate the Supreme Court and the inferior courts
6.2.2.5 declare war
6.2.2.6 admit new states into the Confederation
6.2.3 Congress, by a two thirds majority of each house, has the
power to:
6.2.3.1 requisition emergency funds from the states apportioned
according to population.
6.2.3.2 borrow money on the credit of the Confederation.
6.2.3.3 approve budget deficits.
6.2.3.4 override suspension caused by a proposed Referendum.
6.2.3.5 propose amendments to part two of this constitution.
6.2.4 Congress has the power to override the President s veto by
a supermajority of each house. Such supermajority shall
consist of a two thirds majority for issues ordinarily
requiring a majority, and a five sixths majority for issues
ordinarily requiring a two thirds majority of each house.
6.3 The Senate
6.3.1 The Senate shall consist of 2 senators from each state.
6.3.1.1 If there are more than 25 states but less than 50 states,
the Senate shall consist of 2 senators from each of the
more populous states and 1 senator from each of the less
populous states, for a total number of 50 senators.
6.3.1.2 If there are more than 50 states, the Senate shall consist
of 1 senator from each of the 50 most populous states.
6.3.2 Senators shall be elected by the citizens for a term not
exceeding 6 years in a manner regulated by Congress until
each state passes appropriate legislation.uh
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6.4 The House of Representatives
6.4.1 Each state s number of representatives shall be that state s
fraction of the total population of the Confederation multi-
plied by 250 and rounded to the nearest integer.
6.4.2 Representatives shall be elected by the citizens for a term
not exceeding 4 years in a manner regulated by Congress
until each state passes appropriate legislation.
7 The Supreme Court
7.1 Judicial powers
The judicial power of the Confederation shall be vested in one
Supreme Court and in inferior courts established by law. The judicial
power shall extend to all cases, in law and in equity, arising under
the judicial powers of the Confederation. The judges of both the
supreme and inferior courts, shall hold their offices during good
behavior. They shall receive for their services a compensation,
which shall not be diminished during their continuance in office.
7.2 Judicial review
The Supreme Court and the inferior courts shall each have the power
of judicial review.
7.3 Original jurisdiction and right of appeal
7.3.1 Congress or the People may, by law, decide in which cases
the Supreme Court shall have original jurisdiction, regulate
the right of appeal and the number of Supreme Court
justices, provided that such regulations must be consistent
with this Constitution and may not come into effect until a
new President shall have taken office.
7.3.2 The Supreme Court has the right to propose alterations to
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8 The People
8.1 Requisitioning
The annual per capita charge on the states is to be set at least every
5 years directly by the citizens by Dutch auction. A valid charge
shall have received approval by a double majority.
8.2 The Initiative
8.2.1 The Initiative is the people s power to propose and enact
legislation of any kind except constitutional amendments.
8.2.2 Any citizen qualified to vote may sponsor a draft initiative.
Such draft shall contain the entire text of the initiative.
8.2.3 If the draft initiative is supported by the requisite number of
voters, it becomes qualified to be put on the ballot at the
next confederate election day, provided that the Confedera-
tion always has 100 days to make practical arrangements
and verify the number of supporting voters. Statistical
methods may be used for verification.
8.2.4 Until the citizens decide otherwise, no time limit may be
put on the qualification of draft initiatives.
8.2.5 A qualified initiative is enacted by a double majority.
8.2.6 Legislation enacted by the initiative may not be vetoed by
the President, nor may it be amended by Congress within 5
years of its enactment.
8.3 The Referendum
8.3.1 The Referendum is the people s power to approve or reject,
in part or in whole, any act, bill, order, resolution or vote
of Congress or either house of Congress.
8.3.2 Any citizen qualified to vote may sponsor a draft referen-
dum. Such draft shall specify the act or part thereof
proposed to be referred to the people. It shall contain the
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8.3.3 If the draft referendum is supported by the requisite number
of voters, it becomes qualified to be put on the ballot at the
next confederate election day, provided that the Confedera-
tion always has 100 days to make practical arrangements
and verify the number of supporting voters. Statistical
methods may be used for verification.
8.3.4 A draft referendum must qualify within 6 months of the
referred legislation s enactment in Congress.
8.3.5 Until decided by the citizens, legislation, or parts thereof,
covered by a qualified referendum is suspended, unless
Congress by a two thirds  majority of each house overrides
the suspension.
8.3.6 Legislation covered by a qualified referendum is approved
by a double majority. Legislation not approved is rejected.
8.3.7 Rejected legislation may not be reenacted by Congress
within 5 years of its rejection.
8.4 The Recall
8.4.1 The Recall is the people s power to end the term of any
elected public official and thereby force a new election.
8.4.2 Any citizen qualified to vote may sponsor a draft recall.
Such draft shall name the official to be recalled.
8.4.3 If the draft recall is supported by the requisite number of
voters, a new election shall take place within 100 days.
Statistical methods may be used for verification of the
number of supporting voters.
8.4.4 A draft recall petition must qualify within 6 months of the
end of term of the named official.
8.4.5 Any candidate of the previous election automatically
becomes a candidate if he or she so desires.
8.5 Qualifying initiatives, referendums and recalls
8.5.1 The number of voters required to qualify a draft initiative,
referendum or recall shall be set directly by the citizens at
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8.5.2 The number shall be determined separately for the initiative,
the referendum and the recall. The number for the recall
shall apply to the President, and unless superseded by the
states, 150 % of such qualification apportioned according to
the population of the electoral district shall also apply to
senators, representatives and other elected officials.
8.5.3 The initial qualification shall be set by law.
8.6 The Constitutional Initiative
8.6.1 The Constitutional Initiative is the people s power to
propose and enact amendments to this constitution s part
two. Constitutional initiatives follow the regulations for
initiatives as far as applicable and with the following ex-
ceptions:
8.6.2 The number of voters required to qualify a draft constitu-
tional initiative shall equal 120 % of the qualifying number
for an initiative.
8.6.3 A constitutional initiative is enacted by a double majority of
55%.
8.7 Confederate and state initiated direct legislation
8.7.1 Direct legislation including amendments to this constitu-
tion s part two (confederate institutions), may also be
proposed either by A) confederate statute, or B) by one fifth
of the states, or C) by states that together have one fifth of
the total number of senators, or D) by states that together
have one fifth of the total population of the Confederation.
8.7.2 As far as applicable, confederate and state initiated direct
legislation follows the regulations for the corresponding
direct legislation initiated directly by the citizens.142 The Constitution
9 Bill of Rights
9.1 Applicability
Chapter 9 Bill of Rights and Chapter 10 General provisions of part
two are binding on all confederate institutions at all times, and are
otherwise binding within the powers of the Confederation as defined
in Chapter 3 of this Constitution.
9.2 Non-discrimination
The rights of the citizens cannot be denied or abridged on account
of nationality or ethnic origin, political or religious beliefs, race,
color or sex.
9.3 Voting age
The right of a citizen, being eighteen years of age, to vote or be
elected to an office cannot be denied or abridged.
9.4 Ex post facto law
No bill of attainder or ex post facto law shall be passed.
9.5 Religious freedom
No official religion may be established, nor may peaceful religious
activities be restricted.
9.6 Freedom of speech
9.6.1 The freedom of A) speech and expression, and B) the press
and other media may not be restricted.
9.6.2 Nor may the ownership of media or the transfer of electro-
magnetic frequency rights or other access rights or technical
means of media production and distribution be restricted.
9.7 Right of assembly and association
The right of the people to peaceably assemble or associate or not to
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9.8 Habeas corpus
The writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended.
9.9 Privacy, searches, seizures and interceptions
9.9.1 Everyone has the right of peaceful privacy, which includes
the freedom from unreasonable searches, seizures and inter-
ceptions of his person, papers, information stored or given
in confidence, home, property, communications and effects
of any kind, whether by government or by private parties,
and independent of where the search, interception or seizure
takes place.
9.9.2 No warrants shall issue, but according to law, upon probab-
le cause and particularly describing the place to be searched
or items to be intercepted or seized and the mode of
interception and seizure.
9.9.3 Each year statistics on the number of warrants issued, and
the number of searches resulting in the interception or
seizure of item or items described by the warrant shall be
published.
9.9.4 Compensation is payable to those affected by unsuccessful
or unlawful searches, seizures and interceptions according
to the inconveniences endured.
9.10 Due process
9.10.1 No person shall twice be put in jeopardy of life or limb for
the same offense, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or
property without due process of law.
9.10.2 Anyone deprived of life, liberty or property without later
conviction or convicted, but later found innocent, shall have
just compensation.144 The Constitution
9.11 Criminal prosecutions
9.11.1 In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall:
9.11.1.1 be presumed innocent until proven guilty
9.11.1.2 be entitled to a speedy and public trial by an impartial
court
9.11.1.3 be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation
9.11.1.4 have access to all information presented to the court
9.11.1.5 have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his
favor
9.11.1.6 have the assistance of counsel for his defense
9.11.1.7 be entitled not to incriminate himself
9.11.1.8 have the right of appeal
9.11.2 The accused shall be informed of applicable rights prior to
questioning.
9.11.3 Illegally obtained evidence is inadmissible.
9.11.4 On the accused s application, the court may limit media
coverage prior to conviction.
9.12 Jury
The trial of all crimes shall be by jury, with such exceptions as may
be determined by law for the Supreme Court.
9.13 Excessive bail
Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines or damages
imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.
9.14 Taking of property
9.14.1 Private property, including rights established by contract
and intangible property, shall not be taken, regulated or
encumbered for public use without full compensation.
9.14.2 The previous subsection does not prevent regulations whose
sole purpose is A) the return of monopoly profits to the
customers from whom the profits were derived or B) to
prevent the accumulation of monopoly profits by enhancing
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9.15 Speedy decisions
Whenever an action by a confederate or state institution, court,
agency or officer is required for deciding an issue, whether it be a
permit of any kind, a case to be tried, a sentence to be served or any
other matter, if the action has not been forthcoming within 6 months
of the time such action was desired or required or such shorter time
as is reasonable or such longer time as is reasonable and established
by law, the permit shall be deemed to have been issued, the case
shall be deemed to have been lost by the Confederation or state, the
sentence shall be deemed to have been served and correspondingly
for any other matter.
9.16 Equal protection
9.16.1 The Confederation and its officers may sue and be sued and
shall enjoy no privileges or immunities not accorded other
citizens.
9.16.2 All citizens are equal before the law and have the equal
protection of the laws.
9.17 Monopolies
9.17.1 The Confederation may not erect or protect monopolies or
the acquisition of monopoly profits.
9.17.2 The previous subsection does not prevent the establishment
of intellectual property rights.
9.18 Rights retained by the people
The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights shall not be
construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people.146 The Constitution
10 General provisions of part two
10.1 Election day
Congress shall designate at least one day every year as confederate
election day, and elections and direct votes of the citizens provided
for by this constitution shall take place on such day or days.
10.2 Limit on other office of profit
The President, the senators, the representatives or delegates to the
constitutional convention may hold no other office of profit under the
Confederation.
10.3 Compensation of elected officers
Each elected officer shall receive a compensation for his services,
which shall neither be increased nor diminished during his term in
office.
10.4 Sunset clause
Legislation of any kind except this Constitution, shall expire no later
than 35 years after enactment.
10.5 Sunrise clause
So as not to interfere with the Referendum, legislation may not come
into force within 6 months of enactment unless expressly authorized
by law.
10.6 Confederate budget
10.6.1 Each yearly confederate budget shall contain provisions for
contingent liabilities and obligations payable in the future.
10.6.2 Deficits and surpluses shall be carried forward to the next
budget.
10.7 Constitutional convention
10.7.1 At least every 25 years, each state shall appoint 2 delegates
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proposing the renumbering (reordering) of the individual
clauses of the constitution by putting them in a logical
sequence.
10.7.2 Reordering does not extend to changing the wording of the
individual clauses beyond their numerical designation, or
changing their interpretation.
10.7.3 After having been approved by a majority of the states, the
renumbering shall be submitted to the citizens for approval
as one amendment and be approved according to the
ordinary rules for amending the constitution.
10.7.4 The convention may also propose to the states the repeal,
amendment, clarification or amalgamation of outdated
sections, or the insertion of new sections, but each change
according to this subsection shall be proposed as a separate
amendment.
10.8 Prior law
Directives and prior legislation by the European Community shall
have the force of confederate law.
10.9 First election
The election of the first President and the first Congress shall be
organized by the states according to such rules as the states jointly
decide.IV APPENDICES, REFERENCES
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1 Appendices
1.1 Additional comments on the President s veto powers
Preserving executive independence
Two functions of veto power.
The veto power has two functions, A) preserving the executive as a
power separate from the legislature, and B) providing the citizens
with a defense against pressure groups in the legislature. This second
function, effectively sets the President up as the third house of the
legislature.
The veto power is indispensable when it comes to preserving the
President s independence. Since time immemorial the legislatures of
the world have tried to put themselves in the place of the executive.
There is not necessarily anything sinister in this. On the contrary,
this was how modern democracy came into existence. Even today,
these encroachments come about mostly as a natural function of
legislators interest in politics and their attempts to guide society in
the most advantageous direction. It is a bias built into the system. It
cannot be prevented, but only alleviated through other, if possible
equally strong, counteracting forces.
The veto power also gives the President the means by which he may
defend himself and his office from being reduced to a pawn of the
legislature. Since it is in his own self-interest to do so, he can also
be relied on to exercise this power.
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The value of flexibility.
The veto power introduced into the U.S. presidency was limited in
comparison to the British monarch s veto which was the reference
known to the founders. Instead of having an absolute veto, like the
king of Great Britain, the President was given a limited veto that
could be overturned by a two thirds  vote in each house of Congress.
The framers of the American Constitution believed that a limited
veto would be put to more active use than an absolute veto. They
also hoped that a more active use would in reality render it more
effective. By comparing subsequent political developments in Britain
and the U.S., we can see that this belief in a limited veto was
justified. The King s veto has in reality disappeared, while the
American veto is retained.
A digression on the value of flexibility in a European context
The lesson taught us by the history of the veto power is also applicable to the,current
state of affairs in the European Community, and ought to be a cause for concern.
Today, if a decision of the community is perceived to be contrary to the vital national
interests of a member state, that country may veto the decision. In effect, each
member government has an absolute veto on Community decisions. However, since
this veto is absolute, and since it is binding on all members, its function is very much
like that of the traditional veto powers of the British sovereign.
Is it going to go the way of the British royal veto? Yes, this is the most likely
outcome. It is fairly obvious that there is an increasing reluctance by member countries
to exercise their veto powers. The veto power itself is increasingly perceived only as
a bargaining tool. This is the first step. Over time, the bargaining tool loses its
efficacy as the implied threat becomes less and less credible. (This is already taking
place.) Finally the power itself loses its practical value as the institution rendering the
veto is overwhelmed (by Parliament in the case of the British King, by the European
Commission in the case of the national member countries of the European Com-
munity).
The European community veto power can only be sustained, on two conditions:
A) It has to be flexible, i.e. line item rather than whole bills, extending only
to the member in question and thus not preventing the rest of the community
from introducing the legislation, andAppendix 1.1. The President s veto powers 153
B) As far as possible or eventually it has to be wielded by a group that is
resistant to bargaining and legislative coalitions, i.e. the people itself.
Introducing flexibility in presidential vetoes.
Returning to the confederate President; Experience has shown that
even more flexibility is needed. By bundling together ever more
issues in one bill, Congress has made it harder and harder for the
U.S. President to exercise his veto powers effectively. He cannot
distinguish between the parts he likes and the parts that he doesn t
like. He has to approve or disapprove the bill in its totality. What
makes it even harder, is that Congress has tended to insert especially
objectionable parts into bills (continuing resolutions and debt ceiling
legislation) that the President cannot veto unless he wants the
government to grind to a complete stop. For natural reasons, the
President is reluctant to force the issue by shutting down govern-
ment, and so there has been a steady erosion in executive power, in
the same way, but at a slower pace, than in Britain. If a confederate
President is to preserve his independence, he has to be given more
flexible powers than the U.S. President.
Line item veto.
One option already conferred on many American governors, is the
line item veto. This is the ability to veto one or more lines or parts
of a bill. The line item veto enables the President to defend himself
against the bundling of issues, and effectively restores to him the
veto power lost through such tactics. In continuing resolution bills,
he can veto the objectionable parts without stopping government.
Constitutional sunset clause.
The veto power is also strengthened by giving new Presidents the
opportunity of correcting the mistakes or compromises of previous
Presidents. (See Chapter IX. Section 9.5. Sunset clause.)
Even with a line item veto, no President will veto all items en-154 Appendices, References and Index
crouching on presidential powers. Most Presidents have their own
political program, and will be willing to make sacrifices to ensure
the goodwill of the legislature, or even to make an outright comp-
romise with the legislature to ensure the passage of appropriate
legislation. During the term of a single President, this is not a
problem. But over time, it means that legislation is a one way street.
It accumulates and steadily erodes the powers of the executive at the
expense of the legislature. If allowed to accumulate indefinitely, the
executive is eventually reduced to a pawn.
The veto as a defense against pressure groups
The legislature as a collection of special interests.
The other reason, and perhaps the most important reason for
granting the President veto powers is to provide the citizens with a
defense against special interests. Since the President is elected by the
whole population, he is much more vulnerable to charges of
favoritism than individual representatives and senators. In fact,
representatives and senators, are often expected to work in favor of
special interests. They are all elected from geographical districts, and
they are expected to defend the interests of those districts in the
legislature. Theirs is the interests of the special interests.
The President, on the other hand, cannot get elected or reelected if
he consistently favorsone region or one special interest. By the way
he is chosen, he has to be more aware of the interests of the whole
rather than the parts. Although imperfect, the President on a day to
day basis, is expected to do to the smaller issues, what the people
can do to the larger issues through the instruments of Initiative and
Referendum. He is the representative of the whole people and not its
constituent parts.Appendix 1.1. The President s veto powers 155
Special interests and appropriations.
Besides strengthened veto powers, the author also proposes streng-
thened powers to deal with increasing budgetary deficits. This is a
special problem, not separate from those of legislation generally, but
sufficiently serious and obvious to warrant special attention. Several
sections and subsections deal with this issue.
Most obviously; there has to be a yearly confederate budget, it has
to be honest, and it has to be balanced.
The Confederation may only run a deficit if it is approved by a two-
thirds majority of both houses of Congress. This last condition gives
a way out for those special circumstances when a deficit may be
appropriate, but it makes the decision subject to a Presidential veto
that can only be overridden by a five sixths majority.
Secondly, the President is given the power to enforce the balanced
budget requirement through reducing or eliminating appropriations.
This is a less crude method than the line item veto. By the reasoning
above, this ought to make it more effective. It has the added
advantage that it can be employed as events unfold during the fiscal
year. If the budget has underestimated outlays, the President may
reduce or eliminate non-essential appropriations.
Congress may reinstate appropriations if they are compensated for
by reductions elsewhere, or reinstated by a two thirds majority
(subject to the President s five sixths majority veto power).
Reconciling the case for a unitary independent executive
with the Swiss experience
This book advocates the case of a unitary independent executive, a
powerful elected President. How then, it might be asked, explain the
success of a plural executive like the one found in Switzerland? The ex
planation is simple enough. The success of the Swiss system156 Appendices, References and Index
probably does not rest with its plural executive, but with its system
of referendums and initiatives. If we look to other countries or
organizations, Yugoslavia for instance, or the European Community
or the UN Security Council, we see how useless plural executives
become in times of crisis.
Switzerland of course, has not had a crisis of similar nature since its
introduction of the consensus executive. Also, it was only after the
introduction of the referendum and the initiative that the current
Swiss nonconfrontational system of involving all major parties in the
executive evolved.
In fact the development of the plural executive in Switzerland, points
to another negative aspect of this system beyond its inability for
effective action in times of crisis.
Around the turn of the century, Switzerland, in the eyes of the
parliamentary majority, became almost ungovernable. Every time a
politically controversial proposal was put to the parliament, the
opposition would start a petition drive and have the issue referred to
the voters. The solution to this problem turned out to be to include
the opposition in the executive. It was hoped, and this has turned out
to be true, that by giving the opposition a stake in government, they
would "keep quiet".
The problem with this system is that it limits the choices of the
voters. In today s Switzerland the opposition s teeth has been pulled
so effectively that they no longer, in many circumstances, act as an
effective opposition. Thus there is even in this country, a tendency
of a division between "them" (the federal politicians) and "us" (the
rest of the population). Typically enough, in recent years there have
been a surge in initiatives and referendums, but this time not
sponsored by the minority parties in government, but by outside
groups and single action committees. The real opposition has thus
been transferred, as in so many other countries, from groups withinAppendix 1.1. The President s veto powers 157
the Parliament, to groups somewhat opposed to and outside the
normal political process.
It is a tribute to the strength of the initiative and referendum
processes that in spite of these developments, Switzerland still has
the most responsive government in Europe. But it ought not be a
goal in itself to provide our political agents, the politicians, the
means by which they will be able to insulate themselves, if only to
a limited extent, from the opinions of the public. A unitary indepen-
dent executive will be able to preserve the diversity of opinions
within the central government. This process expands the political
choice of the citizens.158 Appendices, References and Index
1.2 Additional comments on election methods
Contemporary methods of election
The proposed constitution also encourages innovation in election
methods. This appendix describes some alternatives suited to
different circumstances. (The listing is adapted from Kendall,
Frances: Let the People Govern page 150-)
Plurality Voting.
This system, popularly known as "first past the post" or "winner
takes all" is used in the UK, Canada and other countries with a
British tradition. Whoever receives the most votes (but not necessari-
ly more than half) in each constituency wins the election and is
represented in Parliament or Congress. Plurality voting may be
subdivided into two categories depending on whether you have: A)
Asingle representative constituency (e.g. U.K. and House of
Representatives in the U.S.), in which case, the voting often boils
down to selecting a person rather than a party; or B) Multiple
representative constituencies, where party voting is more pre-
dominant.
Plurality voting in general, and especially plurality voting in multiple
representative constituencies is declining in popularity. Two hold-
outs of the latter category may be the electoral college for the
election of the U.S. President  and the election of " senators"
2 in
  The U.S. President is formally elected by an
electoral college consisting of representatives from each
state. However, as all such representatives in modern
times have met with a fixed mandate to vote for a
particular presidential candidate, this is more form than
substance. By electing the representatives to the electoral
college the voters have in reality also decided who isAppendix 1.2. Election methods 159
Switzerland.
Majority voting
Majority voting is similar to plurality voting, except that the winning
candidate(s) must receive more than 50% of the votes. If none of the
candidates receive a majority in the first ballot, there is a second
ballot and sometimes a third depending on how many candidates get
eliminated in each round. Sometimes another voting method is used
in the second and subsequent ballots.
Majority voting is used in the first round in for instance, Australia
and France.
Single Transferable Vote.
As a candidate receives enough votes for his election, all remaining
votes in his favor are transferred to other candidates, listed by the
elector in order of preference. This method may be combined with
proportional representation.
Proportional Representation.
Parties get representation in the legislature depending on their
proportion of the total vote. There are several complex methods for
calculating the actual proportions and dealing with the inevitable
rounding. This is currently the most popular system world-wide.
It has the serious drawback that it leaves in the hands of party
organizations much power that ought to rest in the hands of the
going to be the next president.
2
Members of the federal "Council of States" in
Switzerland are elected according to the plurality method
with the exception of Jura that uses proportional voting.
(Junker, Beat p. 109)160 Appendices, References and Index
voters. In many countries the parties alone draw up the list of
candidates that may not be amended by the voter. To a very large
extent, the parties then actually decide who is going to sit in
Parliament. In other cases, the voter has limited choice within each
party.
Switzerland and Luxembourg have free lists, which means that
though each party lists its candidates in order of preference, each
voter may change the order, include candidates from other lists or
cast two votes for the same candidate.
Alternate methods
The following election methods have not yet been implemented, but
may prove attractive in the future or merit further discussion and
testing. The proposed constitution is flexible enough to accommodate
small scale testing in individual states if wanted by the people.
Continuous voting.
Continuous elections may take place with either of the voting
methods described above. It is most powerful however, when
combined with plurality voting in single representative constituen-
cies. In this case it equals a continuous recall provision.
Continuous elections, or rather a continuous recall provision have
been proposed previously by the Danish philosopher Johannes
Hohlenberg in "Kampen mot Staten", Copenhagen 1947. What
makes this a more realistic alternative today is the coming of
adequate technology.
Continuous elections may for instance, be organized through a
system of automatic voting machines similar in principle to an
automatic teller machine. Instead of depositing or withdrawing
money from a bank account, each voter would be depositing or with-
drawing his vote from a particular party or candidate. Obviously,
checks would have to be built into the system to ensure that eachAppendix 1.2. Election methods 161
voter didn t withdraw or deposit more than one vote. But this in
principle, is no different from, or more difficult to achieve than the
bank making sure that you don t withdraw money you don t have.
The cost would be minimal, on the order of a bank transaction, and
the machines themselves may in fact be combined with commercial
atm s (automatic teller machines).
Probably a continuous election system ought to be combined with a
popular initiative and perhaps some moving averaging for stability.
The popular initiative would give the voter a chance to disagree with
his representative without turning him out of office. The moving
average would give the representative protection against being turned
out of office on a short term flare of discontent.
The major benefit of the described system is improved and con-
tinuous accountability. It might also lead to less emphasis on
campaigning and more emphasis on actual results. It is not clear
however, whether candidates on the average would sit longer or
shorter in office. On the one hand, the lack of a definite election
might make it harder for new candidates to launch themselves and
get the requisite attention. On the other hand, the old hands would
be vulnerable if somehow they ceased doing a good job.
This idea has ramifications beyond what can be given here. Rep-
resentative democracy would again become truly representative. If
a voter changed his mind as to a particular candidate s fitness, he
would withdraw his vote and give it to someone else. If enough
voters agreed, the representative would be out of office. Any official
3 A moving average is an average that is measured
over time. For instance, each candidate s "vote" at any
time may be measured as the average of the actual vote
over the last three months.162 Appendices, References and Index
enjoying widespread respect could sit as long as he pleased. On the
other hand, candidates with fresh ideas, wouldn t have to sit and
wait for the next election.
Representatives as agents.
Alternately representatives may be given voting power in Congress
according to the number of votes received. Thus a candidate with
widespread support would have more voting power than a candidate
who barely made it to the legislature. (Adapted from Johannes
Hohlenberg: Kampen mot Staten.)
This concept may be used together with plurality or majority voting
to put some proportionality into the system without sacrificing the
advantages of individual accountability in single representative
constituencies.
It might also be combined with continuous elections to provide a
representative that is the true (personal) agent of each of his
Individual electors.
Since this idea requires changes to how votes are counted in
Congress, it cannot be decided at the state level (as different election
modes might), but must be decided for the House of Representatives
as a whole.Appendix 1.3. Constitutional amendments 163
1.3 Additional comments on constitutional amendments
Amending procedures
There are essentially three ways of amending constitutions:
• Formal amendment
• Judicial interpretation, and
• Changing usages and conventions
Both judicial interpretation and to a lesser extent, changing usages
and conventions are most important in those countries where the
constitution can be changed only with great difficulty. The typical
case of amending the constitution by judicial interpretation can be
found in the U.S.
The advantages of using formal amendments consist of:
• Public debate and deliberation
• Accessibility to the public, respect for the law
• Popular approval and legitimacy
Disadvantages of informal processes
These three points also underscore the drawbacks of the more
informal or indirect processes. If the constitution is changed by
judicial interpretation, frequently there is little, if any public debate
in advance and often not even in retrospect. However, the lack of
debate in advance is the more serious aspect. If there is no debate in
advance, how can one be reasonably sure that all the relevant
implications have been covered. The short answer is: one is not, and
they are not. Similarly, and this applies to both changing usages and
judicial interpretation, how can one be sure that the people approve
of the changes.164 Appendices, References and Index
Popular approval and legitimacy
The weight of this argument admittedly turns on whether one
believes popular approval is essential or desirable. But its implication
goes further. If the fundamental legal document of a country does
not have the support of the people, how can respect for the lesser
laws be maintained over time. It is claimed that this respect cannot
be maintained, and so the legitimacy of the government itself is
undermined.
Respect for the law and accessibility
Respect for the law also hinges on whether the law is actually
accessible to the public. The easiest method of making law accessible
is obviously by writing it down. Conversely, if there is a discrepan-
cy between what the statute says and the way the law is interpreted,
this is likely to cause confusion and suspicion among the public. The
law loses its legitimacy, becoming the domain of specialists, lawyers
and politicians. Perceptions are here very much reality, if the public
feels that the constitution cannot be easily understood, but rather is
built on sophistry and cleverness, this will over time contaminate
their attitudes toward the rest of the legal system as well.
Most of the time, judicial interpretation and changing usages come
about because either the issues cannot be referred to the people for
decision or the constitution can only be changed with great difficulty.
Thus the informal amending procedures become a substitute for
formal amendment.
The way out of this dilemma is by simplifying the formal amend-
ment of the constitution, and by broadening the number of parties
making propositions.
Constitutional vigor, legitimacy and the Swiss experience
According to the assumptions above, the vigor and legitimacy of a
constitution can be more or less directly related to the pace of
constitutional change. The most effective method of preservingAppendix 1.3. Constitutional amendments 165
written constitutions as a living document is then beyond doubt the
institution of a constitutional voters  initiative. In the first 50 years
of the Swiss constitution of 1848, the Swiss Parliament passed only
eleven amendments. The introduction of the initiative in 1891,
however, marked the beginning of a new era. In its second half
century, the Swiss constitution was amended thirty-seven times. The
effects of the initiative are however, mostly indirect. The initiative
makes the government more accountable and improves the quality of
amendments proposed by the legislature to the point were they are
actually accepted by the people.
Australian experience
In Australia, only 8 amendments have been approved since 1900
when the constitution came into existence (30 have been rejected).
The mode of approval in Australia and Switzerland is similar. The
difference consists in the Australian federal Parliament having the
sole power over proposing amendments. Predictably, proposals in
Australia have mostly consisted of increasing central government
power. Because of lesser accountability the proposals have been self-
serving for the federal government, rather than in the legitimate
interests of the people itself. One almost gets the impression that the
federal government has been attempting to con the people into
approving amendments that was not in their interest. The Australian
Commission of 1988 extends this tradition of popular mistrust and
again show an attachment to the political elite and a further extension
of federal powers.166 Appendices, References and Index
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